28 January 2013. A World to Win News Service. People packed the streets of Diyarbakir 17 January to express their
grief and anger at the murder of three Kurdish women activists, Sakine Cansiz,
55, one of the founders of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), Fidan Dogan, 32,
and Leyla Saylemez, 25. Whoever may turn out to be behind this horrendous crime,
many ordinary Kurds made it clear that they feel they were the target of these
murders.
Accompanying the coffins as they were slowly driven
through this Kurdish city in south-eastern Turkey, an enormous crowd of people
chanted, "We are all Sakine!" On 10 January, within hours of the announcement of
the killings, thousands of Kurdish immigrants had filled the Paris street where
the assassinations took place. There were similar outpourings in several German
cities and elsewhere in Europe.
The three were found shot in the Kurdish Information
Centre in the northern part of the French capital where many immigrants live.
After visiting the scene, France’s Interior Minister Manuel Valls said that the
killings were "without doubt an execution". (The New York Times, 10
January)
Cansiz is widely believed to have been the main intended
victim. She was arrested after the military coup in 1980 and spend 11 years in a
notorious hell hole for Kurdish political prisoners in Diyarbakir. She was said
to have remained defiant under severe torture that scarred her for life. After
her release in 1991 she joined Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of PKK, in the Bekaa
Valley in Lebanon, then under Syrian control. The German news site Der
Speigel wrote, "When Ocalan left Syria under massive Turkish pressure
in the late 1990s, unsuccessfully seeking asylum in Europe, Cansiz was always by
his side until his last arrest in Kenya in 1999, PKK experts say." (11
January 2013)
There has been much speculation about who killed the
three and why, but little publicly-known evidence. The Turkish government and
media rushed to blame the murders on what they called factional conflict in the
PKK regarding the peace talks between the Turkish government and Ocalan. On 28
December Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan had revealed that "his
government had renewed talks with PKK leader Ocalan, who is currently in
solitary confinement on the island of Imrali, in the Sea of Marmara. Shortly
thereafter, one of Erdogan's advisors disclosed that the head of Turkey's MIT
intelligence agency, Hakan Fidan, had spent 23-24 December on the island to meet
with the prisoner." (Der Speigel, 11 January)
Within hours of the murders, Erdogan announced almost
immediately that he believed that the killings "bore the signs of an internal
feud." (The International Herald Tribune, 12 January). A number of people
claiming to be well informed nevertheless contradicted each other in their
statements about Cansiz's position on the peace talks and whether or not such a
split exists.
Another theory adopted by commentators was that the
assassinations were designed to sabotage the negotiation process. Some said that
the killer or killers were sent by high level "deep state" figures from the
military and elsewhere in the power structure opposed to the talks, and/or the
Grey Wolves, a shadowy reactionary organization that has attacked and killed
Turkish radicals and other regime opponents with impunity in the past. Others
put the blame on Iran, Syria or another country that might feel that the
negotiations threaten its interests.
A further possibility that has been suggested is that the
three were killed by the Erdogan-led state, not because of any splits in the
Turkish ruling class, and not out of opposition to the negotiations, but to
weaken the PKK and set the terms for a cruel bargain.
The France police investigating the case have not ruled
out any possibility. Recently they announced the arrest of two young Kurds
living in Paris, one of whom, they say, was a chauffeur for the three women.
There has been little denial of the need for these
negotiations from among the factions that make up the Turkish state, whether
Islamist or non-Islamist, or military or non-military. There seems to be
agreement that under present international and national circumstances, such
negotiations are in the interests of the Turkish ruling class.
This does not mean, however, that they intended to put an
end to the oppression of the Kurds in Turkey. Given that the Turkish state and
its ruling class have always denied that the Kurds are a distinct nationality,
and that they have always used extreme brutality to put down Kurdish demands for
the right to use their language and other forms of national self-expression, as
well as for the right to political self-determination, it is hard to believe
that all this has changed overnight.
Reports have indicated that there have been negotiations
between the Turkish security services and Ocalan on and off since his arrest in
1999. It seems that for the Turkish state, these negotiations seek the same
goals as the state's military attacks on the PKK: to force the PKK to stop their
armed struggle, give up their weapons and, in a word,
surrender.
Further, even before Ocalan's arrest the PKK sought to be
allowed some sort of political power-sharing arrangement under the present
Turkish state. They have negotiated not only with the Turkish state but also
various imperialist powers, trying to assure them of PKK's willingness to
cooperate and play by the rules of the imperialist world. This was accentuated
after Ocalan's arrest and even more when the U.S. occupation of Iraq led to
Kurdish autonomy there under American supervision. In a statement after the
three women were murdered, French President François Hollande mentioned to TV
reporters that he knew one of them personally. Although he provided no details,
it would not be surprising if this meant that there were high level contacts
between the PKK and the French authorities.
In
the last couple of decades the PKK has reorganized itself and its armed
struggles in accordance with these political objectives. First, it has used its
armed struggle mainly as a mechanism to force the Turkish government into
negotiations and also to boost its position at the bargaining table. Secondly,
it has focused the work of a very large number of its members and supporters on
taking part in parliamentary and municipal elections. The Kurdish Peace and
Democracy Party (BDP) now runs almost 100 municipalities. The BDK is often
called the PKK's political wing.
Yet, despite these goals, the prospects for the PKK's
achievement of a power-sharing have gone up and done according to international
and national developments.
In
another words, what Turkish state has meant by negotiations is the one-sided
demand that the PKK disarm and the surrender its forces. What the PKK has meant
by negotiations, especially recently, has been replacing "their demand for
independence with the more practical goals of autonomy, native-language
instruction in public schools, and an end to repression of Kurdish activism.
They also want PKK fighters to be able to return home from their mountain bases
in northern Iraq and to freely engage in democratic politics." (IHT, 15
January)
The international situation has also powerfully effected
both sides. It may be that the situation in Syria is an important factor at this
time. The Turkish ruling classes are seriously worried by the unpredictability
of events and the fact that Kurds and especially PKK have taken local political
power in some Kurdish regions of Syria. The idea of an independent Kurdish state
on a long stretch of Turkey's borders, including not only northern Iraq but also
part of Syria, is a nightmare for them. All this has added to their fears of
instability within Turkey and pushed them to seek to "solve" or neutralize the
"PKK problem" as quickly as possible.
The prospect of Turkey being able to play a new and
bigger role in the Middle East while continuing as a partner of
the U.S. and other Western imperialists has also pushed the Turkish state in
that direction.
But the Turkish state wants to solve this problem on its
own terms. They want to disarm PKK and make them surrender in
exchange for nothing or as little as possible.
After all these negotiations, Erdogan made it clear that
what is on the table is very limited. As he put it "neither general amnesty nor
house arrest were under consideration for Ocalan." So far all that has been
offered the PKK in exchange has been a few kind words for its leader. For
instance, "Bülent Arinc, the Vice-Prime Minister, says that Ocalan had been a
good Muslim in his youth. And MIT head Fidan says approvingly that 'among Kurds
he is a cult figure.'" (Der Speigel, 11
January)
It
has become increasingly evident that the Turkish government is using
carrot-and-stick tactics. In these talks Turkey seeks the same
goals as it does with its military operations against PKK.
In
fact, the Turkish state has continued its military campaigns against PKK forces
in south-east Turkey and northern Iraq. It has continued to harass the Kurdish
people and even the BDP members and leaders. More than 8,000 Kurdish activists
have been arrested over the last four years, including mayors, journalists,
lawyers and other Kurdish intellectuals.
What is on the table, in terms of the Kurdish people's
rights, is just as limited as what is being offered PKK. "The constitutional
provisions… restrict the use of the Kurdish language in schools [and] punish
criticism of the Turkish state." And the Erdogan regime has no intention of
changing this. In a recent interview, he said that "there was no need to
instruct Kurdish students in their native tongue, because they can already study
the language as an elective." (IHT, 15
January)
Under such circumstances it is conceivable that the
Turkish state did not see these negotiations as a reason not to hit harder with
their stick. Whatever the truth may be about these murders, Erdogan and the
state he leads have not laid down their arms and sworn off violence.
On
the day of the funerals of the three women, as they were carried in their
coffins draped with the red, green and yellow Kurdish flag, overhead were
Turkish military aircraft flying to bomb PKK bases and fighters in Qandil, Iraq.
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