(Above: BurmesePLA celebrate their arrival in a liberated township)
Very little coverage is given to events in Burma (Myanmar) by the Australian mainstream media.
However, recent developments show the military regime is
increasingly besieged by a coalition of anti-regime armed forces, and
has to rely on Chinese interference to maintain itself in power.
The various ethnic rebel forces and the Communist Party of Burma’s
People’s Liberation Army are increasingly developing a united front and
providing each other with mutual support and training.
The regime is losing large swathes of territory outside the three
main cities of the Burmese capital, Naypyidaw, and Rangoon and Mandalay.
Its ability to move its army by land corridors is restricted, and it
is relying on airstrikes and long-range artillery bombardment of towns
under rebel control. Air-dropped troop reinforcements often fall into
the hands of anti-junta forces.
Superpowers and their rivalry over Burma
Both superpowers are keen to direct the outcome of struggles within Burma.
The US imperialists have applied sanctions to the military junta
since its takeover, have few direct investments to protect, but are
trying to win over the democratic bourgeoisie and landlord forces
through an encouragement of a return to a “democracy” within which they
can meddle. The 2022 US Burma Unified through Rigorous Military
Accountability Act, known as the BURMA Act, mandates sanctions against
the junta, and authorises substantial humanitarian aid to support the
rival, US-backed National Unity Government (NUG), but not the ethnic
armed organisations (EAOs) or the People’s Defence Forces (PDFs).
Chinese interests are more substantial. Among the most important is
Kyaukpyu Deep-Sea Port, a crucial part of the China-Myanmar Economic
Corridor (CMEC), which gives China direct access to the Indian Ocean,
reducing reliance on the Malacca Strait from which it could be denied
access in the event of war with the US.
There are also the China-Myanmar oil and gas pipelines that run from
the Bay of Bengal to China’s Yunnan province, providing Beijing with a
shorter and strategically secure energy route, again bypassing the
Straits of Malacca. China is financing and constructing key railway and
road links to connect Myanmar with Yunnan province.
China has also invested in multiple hydroelectric dams, and built and
operated several coal and gas power plants. It has a dominant presence
in telecommunications and technology though Huawei and ZTE, and Alibaba
and other Chinese platforms have expanded financial technology services
in Burma.
Chinese real estate companies are active in real estate projects,
particularly in the junta-controlled cities of Yangon and Mandalay.
China has developed industrial parks like the Kyaukpyu SEZ to attract
Chinese and foreign businesses.
Imperialism, not proletarian internationalism
(Above: Villagers welcome the BPLA)
China claims that it is supporting Burmese sovereignty against
threats of foreign (US) interference. A genuinely socialist country
should support any state that is standing up to “outside pressure”, but
it should not support a state that is oppressing its own people.
In 2017, China supported Aung San Suu Kyi’s military offensive
against the Rohingya. When she was overthrown by the junta in 2021, it
flirted with support for the various anti-junta ethnic armies and
allowed the return to Burma of members of the Burmese Communist Party’s
People’s Liberation Army.
It has vacillated between maintaining relations with some of the
ethnic anti-Junta armies and the regime, according to where it perceives
its investments in Burma can be best protected.
For example, last September, fighters of the Kachin Independence
Army, or KIA, seized control of a key military base from the junta at
Chipwe township in Kachin State, close to a Chinese hydro-electric power
station and a Chinese rare earth mine, prompting China to pressure
insurgent forces along the countries' shared border to agree to halt
their offensives against the junta, and closing border crossings through
which medicines and food had flowed.
China’s Customs Department said that China imported more than US$1.4
billion worth of rare-earth minerals from Burma in 2023, underscoring
the importance of “stability” in regions close to its investments.
On November 6, the head of Burma’s military junta, Senior Gen. Min
Aung Hlaing, travelled to China, meeting with Chinese Premier Li Qiang
in Kunming. China signalled that it desires the bare minimum stability
to protect its interests and it felt the junta is the horse to back to
achieve this. China has said that it will support the junta’s electoral
process later this year, a clear indication that it will work to keep
the junta in power.
Meanwhile, ethnic armies and the BPLA continue to take territory from
the regime. The Kachin and Ta’ang, as well as the Arakan Army in
Rakhine, continue to resist China’s pressure.
Hostilities between the junta regime forces and the Ta'ang National
Liberation Army (TNLA) have recommenced as of January 9, 2025, following
the initiation of a new military operation by the junta in Naungcho
township.
The Arakan Army (AA) stated on Monday January 26 that it had seized
control of the Moehti hilltop outpost in Bago Region on the previous day
- five days after it launched its attack. The military outpost is
located in the Arakan Mountains, known as the Rakhine Yoma.
Of passing interest to Australians is the role of Julie Bishop as the
United Nations’ Special Envoy on Myanmar. The former Australian Foreign
Minister will no doubt pursue US strategic interests in Burma. It
should not be overlooked that in March 2017, the government of PM
Malcolm Turnbull rejected a Senate vote calling for a United Nations
commission of enquiry into the persecution of the Rohingya.
Several weeks later, it reversed its position and co-sponsored a
resolution at the UN human rights forum for the UN to send a
fact-finding mission to Myanmar. The change was partly fuelled by an
upsurge of reported atrocities against the Rohingya on one hand, and
Australia’s hypocritical push for membership of the UN Human Rights
Council from 2018.
Bishop can be expected to try to do deals to facilitate China’s
acceptance of the pro-US National Unity Government should the regime
fall to the united resistance front.
For now, we can only support the fight of the combined Burmese
resistance for national liberation, independence and democracy, and
oppose all outside superpower interference that runs counter to the
aspirations of the Burmese peoples.
Written by: Nick G. on 30 January 2025