Excerpt from "against avakianism" by Ajith, Secretary of the former Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) NAXALBAR, today merged in the CPI
THE NATIONAL TASK IN OPPRESSED NATIONS
We have already spoken to Avakian’s mechanical transposition
of the internal and external contradictions in a country. He further criticises
Mao’s observations on the shift of principal contradiction. This is what Mao
wrote: “When imperialism launches a war of aggression against such a country,
all its various classes, except for some traitors, can temporarily unite in a
national war against imperialism. At such a time, the contradiction between
imperialism and the country concerned becomes the principal contradiction,
while all the contradictions among the various classes within
the country (including what was the principal contradiction, between the
feudal system and the great masses of the people) are temporarily relegated to
a secondary and subordinate position. …
“But in another situation, the contradictions change
position. When imperialism carries on its oppression not by war, but by milder
means--political, economic and cultural--the ruling classes in semi-colonial
countries capitulate to imperialism, and the two form an alliance for the joint
oppression of the masses of the people. At such a time, the masses often resort
to civil war against the alliance of imperialism and the feudal classes, while
imperialism often employs indirect methods rather than direct action in helping
the reactionaries in the semi-colonial countries to oppress the people, and
thus the internal contradictions become particularly sharp.”[1]
Evidently, Mao considers the contradiction with imperialism
as one with an external force. This is what Avakian takes offence with, since
for him 1) it is internal to the world as a whole and 2) through its
penetration, it becomes an intrinsic part of the socio-economic structure of
colonial, semi-colonial countries. We have already seen the absurdity of his
first argument. His second one rests on a sounder basis, provided the
country-wise specificities of bureaucrat capitalism, the main form of
imperialist penetration, and semi-feudalism are accounted for. But even though
imperialism becomes intrinsic through them, Avakian’s criticism fails. Even
more, it proves to be a prescription for suicidal sectarianism. The crux lies
in grasping Mao’s observation “When imperialism launches a war of aggression
against such a country, all its various classes, except for some traitors, can
temporarily unite in a national war against imperialism.” This possibility is
obviously given by imperialism being an external, a foreign enemy, despite imperialist
relations becoming intrinsic to the economy. Any thinking that denies the
externality of imperialism will inevitably undermine the ability of the
communist party to unite with the just national sentiment of the people and
mobilise the vast majority in the country in a war of national liberation.
It may be objected that Avakian and the RCP have written
quite a lot about imperialist oppression and have never denied the national
component of the new democratic revolution. Well it’s like their writings on
Mao. Despite a lot of nice words, in the Avakianist scheme, the national task,
even in an oppressed country, is in essence treated as an unwelcome burden
suffered by its ‘ideal’ proletariat. It is admitted, and then undermined. Its
perversion of internationalism forces it to deny the necessity for the party of
the proletariat to raise the national banner in these countries.[2] Mao’s stand, “in wars of
national liberation patriotism is applied internationalism.” is rejected as
nationalism. [3]
Mao had put forward the approach, “Make the past serve the
present, and make the foreign things serve China".[4] The first, guards against comprador
modernist disparagement of past knowledge and traditions. It also breaks away
from uncritical worship of the past, where feudal values are carried over under
the guise of national culture. The second warns against the comprador aping of foreign
things or their xenophobic rejection. Avakian attacks this dialectical approach.
He picks on the words “serve China”
and brandishes it as yet another example of Mao’s nationalist tendencies.[5] This is a particularly shocking
example of how Avakian’s distorted version of internationalism leads him to
dismiss revolutionary tasks, thrown up by the specificities of colonial,
semi-colonial conditions, including that of critically absorbing the national
heritage.[6] It is a gross manifestation
of the imperialist economism that has for long been a trademark of the RCP’s
approach.[7]
To give some other examples of its imperialist economism, in
the early 1980s it was dismissing almost all resistance struggles in the
oppressed nations as mere extensions of inter-imperialist contention. In the
recent period it repeats the same by bracketing the resistance in Iraq and Afghanistan
with the US
led imperialist aggression. The exercise of formal logic is rather blunt: ideologies
of both the adversaries are reactionary, one imperialist and the other
fundamentalist; therefore it’s a case of confrontation between reactionaries.
That’s all there is to it, though the US camp must be termed the “greater
threat to humanity and the principal culprit”. What does this analysis,
seemingly taking a position on the side of the oppressed, actually accomplish?
An examination of the contradictions propelling the
resistance is eliminated. The task of uniting with the just sentiments of resistance
to national oppression, even while struggling against the reactionary Islamic
fundamentalist, revivalist ideologies and the tactical issues this raises, is
excluded. The Maoists are thus pushed into sectarianism and the national
resistance is weakened. Above all, the objective role these resistances have
played and still play, in delivering a heavy blow to US imperialism’s plans, encouraging
anti-imperialist sentiments and allowing new imperialist contentions to sharpen,
is simply ignored.[8]
Though Avakianism was claiming to be upholding Leninism as
the key link, its notions of internationalism were in fact pitting Lenin
against Lenin. This is sharply seen in its claim of having salvaged the
Leninist concept of internationalism from its distortions at the hands of
Stalin and Mao. In the words of the RCP letter, “Avakian addresses the
difference between Lenin's understanding of internationalism and that of the
Irish revolutionary John Connolly. Connolly argued that internationalism was
the support or aid that one revolution extends to another, unlike Lenin's more
scientific understanding, in his own words, that the revolution in each country
should be seen as ''my share in the preparation, the propaganda and the
acceleration of the world revolution.''”[9] But on another occasion Lenin
wrote, “There is one, and only one, kind of real internationalism, and that is
- working wholeheartedly for the development of the revolutionary movement and
the revolutionary struggle in one's own country, and supporting (by propaganda,
sympathy and material aid) this struggle, this, and only this, line in every
country without exception.”[10] What are we to make of that?
Should we conclude, following the Avakianist logic, that the second quote is an
example of ‘Lenin departing from Leninism’? Or is it the case that the RCP is legitimately
arguing for conceiving “development of revolutionary struggle in one’s own
country” as doing “my share in the world revolution”? But, if that were true,
it would be negating its own attack on Mao. Avakian presented Mao’s position on
internationalism as follows: “… ‘we have to advance the Chinese nation to
socialism and on to communism and we have to at the same time support and do
all we can to advance the world revolution so that the people of the whole
world and of all nations advance to communism, too.’ I think that was a genuine
view in Mao but it is not fully the correct view.”[11]
What Mao really said was this, “Leninism teaches that the
world revolution can only succeed if the proletariat of the capitalist
countries supports the struggle for liberation of the colonial and
semi-colonial peoples and if the proletariat of the colonies and semi-colonies
supports the proletariat of the capitalist countries…for this is the only way
to overthrow imperialism, to liberate our nation and people and to liberate the
other nations and peoples of the world. This is our internationalism, the
internationalism with which we oppose both narrow nationalism and narrow
patriotism”[12]
Later, correcting Stalin’s mistaken view on the final victory of communism, he
made it clear that either all will go to communism together or none will.
We can directly see how Mao’s positions accord to Lenin’s
views as seen in both of his quotations.
But the logic of Avakianism leads it to see them as contradictory. This
flows from the way it grasps and conceptualises the world socialist revolution.
Formally it accepts the two components of the world socialist revolution – the
socialist revolutions in the imperialist countries and the new democratic
revolution in the oppressed countries. But in its idealist, upside down, view,
these two components are in fact taken as emerging from the world
socialist revolution. This metaphysical construct thus replaces the real historical
process by which the latter has taken form through the emergence and union of
the two components. Its reductionist concept of the dynamics by which the
fundamental contradiction of the bourgeois epoch works itself out, through
revolutions (that resolve distinctly different contradictions) in the two types
of countries, inevitably leads to this.
What underlies Avakianism’s metaphysical concepts on the
world revolution? This must be examined in relation to its formative process,
particularly the way it read and responded to the setback in China and its
repercussions in the RCP. For the present we note the powerful pull of petty
bourgeois impetuosity that had seized it at times. For example, Avakian’s
attack on Mao’s vision of internationalism is prefaced by a discussion on his so-called
‘linear, country-by-country advance, first to socialism and then to communism’.
He criticises “…a certain tendency recurring in Mao to make a principle out of
the policy of making use of contradictions among the enemies, defeating the
enemies one by one.” Recklessly plunging on he asks, if all the enemies of the
international proletariat can be defeated at one go why not take on all of them
and do it? The logical corollary follows, “…in the context of a world war it
might be correct to in fact strike out in different directions, viewing the
world as a whole; that is, to oppose the imperialists in general and to attempt
to overthrow them wherever possible in both camps, of course taking into the
account the particular situation in different countries.” [13] There is more of the same
kind, comical in its fantasising, as equally as it is alarmingly suicidal in
its prescriptions.
A willingness to strike out in all directions may appear as a
determined, consistent, revolutionary approach in someone’s day dreams. The
real world remains as a rude correction. Avakian wishes away all concrete
specificities. For instance, would the opportunities and challenges faced by
the international communist movement at the time of a world war be the same in
a condition where there is no socialist country and one in which either one or
more exist? In 1981, when Avakian was writing this, no socialist state existed.
Except for those who went over to the camp of Chinese revisionism, all Maoist
parties regarded both the imperialist blocs (led by the US and the erstwhile Soviet
Union respectively) as enemies. It was well understood that Mao’s
instruction on dividing the enemy where possible and uniting the many to defeat
the few would not be immediately relevant in that situation at the
international level. The Maoists followed the orientation of “revolution
preventing war, or war leading to revolution”, in other words making revolution
or preparing for it. Here, the immediate relevance of Mao’s policy where a
revolutionary struggle was going on, as well as in working out strategy and
tactics as part of preparation, was firmly grasped – by those who were grounded
in reality. The long term relevance of Mao’s policy instructions was also
appreciated since, for a long time to come, even after new socialist states are
born, they would be encircled by imperialism. Avakian’s fantasies born of
impetuosity sought to dismiss all such real issues.
This went to the extent of fantasising about collapsing the
two stages, new democratic and socialist stages, of revolution in the oppressed
nations into a single one. The fantasy had its logic: “…overall it [he means
the number of stages] is more determined by what’s happening in the world as a
whole than it is by what’s happening in one country.”[14] Earlier we had noted how, in
the RCP’s scheme, the national task in the revolution of an oppressed country,
is admitted and then undermined. It is seen and treated as an ‘unwelcome
burden’. We now see that this is equally true of the democratic task. The argument
Avakian advanced was illuminative. He asked, if the German revolution had
preceded the Russian one, couldn’t they have handled the peasant question in a
different manner?[15] Let us accept this
speculation. But how can the example of Russia, quite backward but
basically an imperialist power, be compared to the oppressed countries? In Russia the
democratic task was to be carried out by the proletariat in the passing.[16] In the oppressed countries it
is a vital task of revolution, along with the national task - the foundation for the advance to socialism and communism. This
is why the revolution has two stages, new democratic and socialist. What will
happen if this is denied and they are collapsed into a single stage? The new democratic
revolution which addresses the twin tasks of national liberation and
anti-feudal democratic revolution will be eliminated on the plea of a quicker
passage to socialism. Though later on in his article Avakian tried to hide
tracks by reiterating his adherence to ‘two stage revolution’, the essence of
his arguments amounted to smuggling in Trotskyism.
Another example of the extremes to which Avakian’s perversion
of internationalism took him is his approach on the dialectics of advancing the
world revolution and protecting the socialist state. Overall, his starting
point is the correct criticism on the CPSU (B) led by Stalin for subordinating the
interests of world revolution to the interests of the Soviet
Union. This is a position generally accepted by Maoists. From this
the Maoists take lessons, recognising the contradiction between these two
interests and stressing the need for a socialist country to act as a base of
world revolution, to subordinate its interests to the world proletarian
revolution. Avakian’s flights of fantasy took him elsewhere. He stated, “… there is a limit, … to how far
you can go in transforming the base and superstructure within the socialist
country without making further advances in winning and transforming more of the
world…there’s also the fact that this is the era of a single world process and
that has a material foundation, it’s not just an idea. What may be rational
in terms of the production, even, and utilisation of labour power and resources
within a single country, carried beyond a certain point, while it may seem
rational for that country, is irrational if you actually look upon a world
scale. And that reacts upon that country and becomes an incorrect policy,
not the best utilisation of things even within that country, and begins to work
not only against the development of the productive forces but, dialectically
related to that, against the further transformation in the production relations
(or the economic base) and the superstructure.”[17] The implied suggestion is
that the socialist country must directly spread and carry out revolution in
other countries as a condition for its continued advance.[18] Assuming this succeeds, and
it then addresses its production tasks from the ‘rationality of the world
scale’, what would be the consequences?
The moment we think in these terms, the dangerous
implications of the Avakianist concept of a ‘single world process and its
material base’ forcefully come out. Will the ‘rationality’ of production tasks
be the same for the victorious proletariat in both the types of countries? Can
these differences be dismissed by citing the overall interests of the
international proletariat at the ‘world scale’? How should the proletariat
judge the ‘rationality’ of resource utilisation and development while building socialism?
Should it be done mainly from an economic angle, judging things on the
‘economies of scale’? Should it follow classical bourgeois political economic
prescriptions of each country doing what it can do best and trading with others
for its remaining needs? Or should it be done from a political viewpoint that
addresses the need to overcome the severe dependence and disarticulation, left
over from imperialist domination? To contribute to the world revolution, serve
as its base, the victorious proletariat in any country cannot and must not
make what’s best at the ‘world scale’ its criteria. Because, no matter what the
political rhetoric, its content will inevitably be narrow economic rationality.
This is particularly decisive for any country liberating itself from the
clutches of imperialism. It is also important for a fledgling socialist state
in an erstwhile imperialist country, since it too will be tasked with ending
the parasitical ties of the economy. For a long time, the proletariat must address
the production tasks primarily at the ‘national scale’. It must strive
for self-reliance for the country as a whole and its regions, as a matter of
principle. In the narrow (bourgeois) economic sense this would be irrational; a
waste of resources. In its view, even a rational utilisation of resources
within a country could be unnecessary and irrational from the viewpoint of the
world economy (Avakian’s ‘world scale’). From the long term view of world
proletarian revolution, in order to overcome and end the lop-sidedness in the
world so that all can become equals and thus create favourable grounds to
advance to communism, it would be eminently rational.
Even in a condition where socialist states have emerged in
most of the imperialist countries, the socialist camp would still be heavily
marked with carryovers of the unequal relations of imperialism. Avakian has
paragraphs on imperialist lop-sidedness in the world. But his orientation makes
it empty talk. It simply brushes aside issues posed by unequal relations and disarticulation.
For all his criticism of Stalin’s metaphysics, imperialist economism pushes him
to repeat the errors committed in the Soviet Union.
Under the socialist state, the division of economic tasks between the advanced
European and backward Asian republics was guided by a similar argument on
rational use of resources. In effect, it carried over the distortions and
dependencies of the Czarist empire. Rupturing from this, Mao noted in his
‘Critique of Soviet Economics’, “I
wonder why the text fails to advocate each country’s doing the utmost for
itself rather than not producing goods which other countries could supply? The
correct method is each doing the utmost for itself as a means toward
self-reliance for new growth, working independently to the greatest possible
extent, making a principle out of not relying on others, and not doing
something only when it really and truly cannot be done. Above all, agriculture
must be done well as far as possible. Reliance on other countries or provinces
for food is most dangerous.”[19] Avakian’s logic, supposedly
meant to enable the proletariat to advance, takes a leap backward, away from
the heights achieved by Maoism.
THE NATIONAL QUESTION
IN IMPERIALIST COUNTRIES
We have,
till now, unravelled Avakianism’s disastrous effects on the tasks of revolution
in oppressed countries. What about its guidance for imperialist countries? By digging
into the roots of nationalist deviations within the international communist
movement and exposing some of its concrete manifestations in imperialist countries
it had produced some positive results. In particular, it had pinpointed the
pandering to nationalism seen in Comintern and in the CPSU (B) policies in the
period leading up to the 2nd world war period and during the war. The losses
caused by subordinating the interests of world revolution to those of the Soviet Union were also analysed. Furthermore, the 1963
General Line put forward by the Communist Party of China under Mao’s leadership
was also criticised for its advocacy of national interests in the secondary
imperialist powers. Overall, these were correct criticism. But, since these
criticisms were guided by its wrong understanding of internationalism, they
were interwined with a lot of one-sidedness. While the positive aspects of its
criticisms were accepted, its one-sidedness became a target of struggle right
from the very beginning.
Fighting against the social chauvinist’s
position of ‘defence of the fatherland’ during the 1st world war, Lenin
had correctly pointed out that the national question was basically exhausted in
imperialist countries. Drawing on this he advanced the policy of ‘revolutionary
defeatism’[20]
and called for a line of transforming the imperialist war into a revolutionary
civil war. Picking on these positions and interpreting it one-sidedly, Avakian
went on to deny any role for the national aspect in imperialist countries. While
the main thrust of his criticisms was against errors committed by Stalin and
the Comintern, Lenin was also made a target. Avakian posed the question of whether
or not it is correct to view the working class as being the inheritors of the
traditions of the nation. He answered in the negative and made this a
cornerstone for his arguments. In the process, he criticised Lenin’s article
‘The National Pride of the Great Russians’, and delivered yet another example
of his faulty method.
Avakian accepted that Lenin had stuck to
revolutionary defeatism in this article. His complaint was that Lenin was
trying to justify it by saying it’s correct because the Russian proletariat has
national pride. This is criticised as an attempt to ‘combine two into one’.[21] Lenin had related
national pride of the Russian proletariat to the rich tradition of struggle and
resistance within the Russian empire. This was counterposed to slavishness to the
Czarist Empire.[22]
He overturned the chauvinist framework in which the ‘fatherland’ question was
being posed and placed it firmly within the wider issue of the oppressed
nations, particularly of those within the Russian empire. He reiterated this by quoting Marx,
"No nation can be free if it oppresses other nations.” Lenin thus
pointed out the logical
connection between democratic, national traditions of resistance with
contemporary defeatism. He concluded, “we say: it is impossible, in the
twentieth century and in Europe (even in the far east of Europe), to “defend
the fatherland” otherwise than by using every revolutionary means to combat the
monarchy, the landowners and the capitalists of one’s own fatherland, i.e., the
worst enemies of our country. We say that the Great Russians cannot “defend the
fatherland” otherwise than by desiring the defeat of Tsarism in any war, this
as the lesser evil to nine-tenths of the inhabitants of Great Russia.”
Evidently what we see here is not
some ‘two into one’ combination but an artful presentation of the Bolshevik
position, penetrating the extreme jingoism that existed in the initial period
of the war.[23] This is quite explicit not only from the
particular style of argument Lenin adopted but also from his choice of words
like “Great Russian proletariat”, “Great Russian Social Democrats” etc. and his qualification
of Marx and Engels as the “greatest representatives of consistent nineteenth
century democracy”. Avakian totally missed or ignored the specificity of
the situation in which that propaganda tract was written. All he noted was the
pressure of chauvinism existing at that time, implying that Lenin was conceding
space to it in his writing. This is inevitable given Avakian’s position that
the proletariat, being an international class, cannot represent or be the
continuator of any national tradition.
Avakian eclectically mixed up two separate
aspects. One of them is the internationalism of the proletariat, a matter of its
ideology. The other is the complex concreteness of its emergence and existence
in different countries. The proletariat of any country emerges and takes form
through a historical process, a process specific to that country. This historic
process could be initiated by world developments. Even then it would be
specifically national in form and characteristics. This is not merely a
material process. It incorporates the
culture and traditions of the country, more particularly those of the labouring
people. It will also include the democratic traditions of the modern period. This
is why, historically, the proletariat represents progressive, democratic
traditions of a nation. This is an objective, inevitable, part of its
existence. Accepting this does not, as such, negate the internationalist
character of the proletariat. That depends on the ideological approach. The
Comintern was not committing a mistake by noting national traditions. Its
nationalist deviation lay in posing the defence of national traditions as a
task of the proletariat in an imperialist country, particularly in the context
of a war. We saw how Lenin dealt with national traditions in an entirely
opposite manner leading to a revolutionary defeatist position. Avakian lumped up
everything together and made a mess.
Not only that, he cut up Lenin’s views into bits
and pieces and did an arbitrary copy/paste job. Thus, while commenting on the approach
to the Versailles Treaty[24], Avakian first mentioned
Lenin’s views on the matter as seen in his work ‘Left-wing Communism’. Arguing
against the ‘Left’ communists in Germany who were insisting on immediately
repudiating the Treaty, Lenin wrote, “To give absolute, categorical and
immediate precedence to liberation from the Treaty of Versailles and to
give it precedence over the question of liberating other countries oppressed by
imperialism, from the yoke of imperialism, is philistine nationalism…not
revolutionary internationalism.”[25] The italicised words
clearly indicate that the difference was not over whether that Treaty should be
opposed or repudiated, but when. Furthermore, a reading of the whole
text shows that Lenin was basing his arguments on the expectation of a
revolution in Germany.[26] Avakian simply left all
that out. He then proceeded to accuse Lenin of having departed from his initial
internationalist stand by “…pushing the communists in Germany a little bit to
raise the national banner in Germany against the Versailles Treaty and against
the victors’ feast at the expense of Germany.”[27] First of all this is a
gross distortion – Lenin was calling for agitation against the harsh conditions
of the Versailles Treaty, which was placing a heavy burden on the German
masses. Avakian brands this as ‘raising the national banner’. Secondly, Lenin
was proposing this in changed conditions, where the immediate prospect for revolution
had receded in Germany.
When both of these factors are considered, all that remains of Avakian’s
criticism is a wretched demonstration of the total disregard he has for
concrete analysis of concrete conditions. Not surprisingly, he was critical of
Lenin’s broad characterisation of the post-war situation that placed Germany among
those reduced to a colonial condition through the conditions imposed by the
victor states. Instead of grasping this
objective situation and the opportunity it afforded (as Lenin did) Avakian
misrepresents Lenin position to mean “…Well, my imperialists got whipped so now
it’s okay for me to defend the fatherland…”[28] Once again we see how
Avakian’s perversion of internationalism immediately pushes anything national
into the domain of bourgeois chauvinism.
What Lenin was getting at was the possibility of
utilising the contradiction, generated by the subjugation of Germany, in
favour of the proletariat. Exposing the Versailles Treaty as unjust, which it
was, would not in itself mean allying with German imperialist interests or
waving the national flag. It could be done without any weakening of the
proletarian stand and outlook. The harsh impact it was having on the common masses
was itself a strong ground for this. Such opposition would unite with the just sentiments
of the masses, without getting caught up in its spontaneous national framework.
It could thus strengthen the Communist party’s capacity to resist bourgeois,
petty bourgeois chauvinism. This is why Lenin, who had earlier opposed an
immediate call to repudiate the Versailles Treaty, later proposed that the
German communists should take up agitation against that treaty.
In all of these examples, we see how Lenin masterfully
addressed and tried to utilise national aspects while working out proletarian
tactics. This was done without in the slightest departing from his position
that the national question was, basically, a thing of the past in imperialist
countries. By adding the qualification ‘basically’, its relevance in particular
situations was being noted. Avakianism paid token admittance to this by citing
the example of Ireland,
which was at that time a colony of Britain. But is that all there is
to it? Let us go through Lenin’s criticism of the Junius pamphlet. While
welcoming its attack on social chauvinism Lenin criticised it for “…trying to
drag a national programme into the present non-national war.”[29] But that was not all. He
was also critical of its exclusion of the possibility of national wars. He
wrote, “The fact that the postulate that “there can be no more national wars”
is obviously fallacious in theory is not the only reason why we have dealt with
this fallacy at length. It would be a very deplorable thing, of course, if the
“Lefts” began to be careless in their treatment of Marxian theory, considering
that the Third International can be established only on the basis of Marxism,
unvulgarised Marxism.”[30]
The national wars Lenin had in mind were mainly
those of the colonies and the oppressed nations within imperialist boundaries,
like those in the Russian Empire. He held the view that the transformation of
the imperialist war (1st world war) into a national war was “highly
improbable”. But he also recognised that it could not be ruled out even in
the advanced capitalist countries. Lenin wrote, “… if the European
proletariat were to remain impotent for another twenty years; if the present
war were to end in victories similar to those achieved by Napoleon, in the subjugation
of a number of virile national states; if imperialism outside of Europe
(primarily American and Japanese) were to remain in power for another twenty
years without a transition to socialism, say, as a result of a
Japanese-American war, then a great national war in Europe would be possible.
This means that Europe would be thrown back
for several decades. This is improbable. But it is not impossible, for to
picture world history as advancing smoothly and steadily without sometimes
taking gigantic strides backward is undialectical, unscientific and
theoretically wrong.”[31] Such dialectical insight
is excised by Avakianism through its so-called excavation of Leninism. It would
be more appropriate to term it as the ‘hollowing of Leninism’.
When
Lenin wrote about a national war in Europe he
was obviously conceiving of one fought on bourgeois terms. But the
possibilities he examined, such as ‘subjugation of a number of virile national
states’, had far reaching implications. They became explicit during the 2nd
world war when a number of European imperialist countries were overrun and
occupied by Hitler’s armies. As Lenin had predicted, this vastly strengthened bourgeois
nationalism in the subjugated countries. It became a rallying banner of armed resistance.
How should the Communist parties have responded to this situation? True to his
doctrinarianism Avakian declared, “The argument that Lenin made in relation to
World War 1 precisely applies to World War 2. He said … if Paris
or St. Petersburg
were to be occupied by the “enemy” troops … that [would not] change the nature
of the war… he meant a serious invasion and actual occupation, and he pointed
out in any case that invasions are inevitable in almost every war.”[32]
The
nature of the war between the occupying and occupied imperialist bourgeoisie
would not change in the short term.[33] But what about the
revolutionary war to be organized and led by the proletariat? Obviously it
would no longer be a civil war, since it would be immediately directed
against a foreign occupier, against its state. The idiocy of Avakianism
can easily declare, why bother whether it’s foreign or not; all that counts is
that it is an imperialist bourgeoisie. But for a proletarian vanguard that
really strives to win it does matter because it presents a wholly different set
of opportunities and challenges. In the Second World War, an important
opportunity that emerged through German occupation of these countries was that
national and anti-fascist democratic sentiments could be drawn on in favour of a
revolutionary war led by the proletariat. The challenge would be of drawing on
this powerful reserve while maintaining ideological and organisational
independence. The challenge would be in sticking to the proletariat’s strategic
tasks even when tactical alliances are made with other forces, including the
bourgeoisie resistance. The challenge would also be in advancing appropriate
tactics, including, if necessary, transitional stages, without abandoning the
socialist revolution. The Comintern’s mistaken positions, complemented by
revisionism of the concerned parties, forsook this. Hence the resistance built
up by the Communist parties in most of the occupied European countries
restricted their program to driving out the occupiers and restoring bourgeois
republics. (The exceptions were Yugoslavia
and Albania.)
Avakian’s
mutilated application of Lenin was an excuse to avoid the real issues posed by
the conditions in occupied imperialist countries during the 2nd
world war. Through struggle during the 1984 international conference this was
rejected. The Declaration adopted by it recorded, within the limits possible
then, “In the European countries occupied by German fascist troops it was not
incorrect for the Communist Parties to take tactical advantage of national
sentiments from the standpoint of mobilising the masses, but errors were made
due to raising such tactical measures to the level of strategy.”[34]
Finally,
we come to a possible outcome of the Avakianists’ metaphysical treatment of internationalism
and the national question – its potential to turn into its chauvinist opposite.
This is already indicated in its proposal for a ‘New
Socialist State
in North America’. The proposed draft
Constitution for this state says that its final form will be decided on the
basis of various factors including “…the size of the territory that had been
liberated from the imperialists (and other reactionaries) and
consolidated as the territory of the new socialist state…”[35] The new socialist state is
predicated on the destruction of the existing US imperialist state. Beyond
that, the formulation ‘in North America’, along with mention of
territory liberated from other reactionaries, indicates that the new
state could also extend beyond the present territory of the USA. What are
the implications?
North
America contains two other countries, the oppressed country Mexico and imperialist Canada. Countries
are not simply territories. Moreover, a liberated Mexico will face the arduous task
of eliminating centuries old ties of oppression and becoming self-reliant. Even if its main former oppressor, the USA, also
became socialist, being on its own will be more conducive for this task. It
would also be far better for the internationalist struggle for communism, which
can only be achieved together; all acting as equals. Therefore this proposal
for a ‘New Socialist State in North America’ coming from a party in the
dominant imperialist country of that continent is a dangerous recipe for
expansionism, even if it’s posed as ‘seizing the maximum territory for the
proletariat”.
INFANTILE CRITICISM
OF UNITED FRONT TACTICS
The United Front policy adopted by
the 7th Congress of the Comintern, held in 1936 in the wake of
Hitler’s ascendance in Germany
and the rising threat of world war made several mistakes. But, in its criticism
of these mistakes, the RCP jumped to the exact opposite. It denied the
significance and importance of differentiating between fascism and bourgeois
democracy. It denied the necessity of striving to form a tactical united front
against fascism.[36]
Thus, the general tendency to absolutise things and end up as the other side of
the coin was seen in this matter too. The 2nd International
Conference of 1984 rejected this. It held that it was correct to distinguish
between fascism and bourgeois democracy. Along with that it identified the
Comintern’s mistake of absolutising the difference between these two forms of
bourgeois dictatorship and making a strategic stage of the struggle against
fascism.
Since then the RCP has corrected
its mistake of refusing to distinguish between fascism and bourgeois democracy.
But the basic error in its positions on united front tactics, which also
underlay that mistake, remains to be corrected. It continues as a fundamental
position of Avakianism and, presumably, is regarded as another ingredient of
the ‘new synthesis’. We must therefore get into this.
Why would a communist party or
socialist state enter into a united front with a section of its enemies? It
does so in order to utilise contradictions among its enemies and thus create a
more favourable situation to advance revolution. Avakian ruled out this
possibility. He wrote, “… to get into that whole sort of posture of trying to manoeuvre
the imperialists to fight this way and not that way, and on this terrain and
not that, to attack this and not that, already gets you into very dangerous territory,
and a very dangerous dialectic.”[37] Well yes, it’s true that
entering into a united front with reactionaries strengthens the danger of
tailism. But that is the dialectic of the real world far removed from
Avakianism’s construct of pure relations and even more pure politics. United
front tactics brings up opportunities for revolutionary advance, not just
dangers. Faced with formidable enemies, a communist party or socialist state
must make use of all opportunities to intensify contradictions among them. It
must strive to make them “…fight this way and not that way, and on this terrain
and not that, to attack this and not that…”. Avakian not only denied this but
created confusion by bringing in irrelevant issues such as the essence of the
actions of reactionaries. Thus, commenting on the united front between the
Soviet Union and the Allied imperialist bloc during the 2nd world
war, he wrote, “To justify the kind of all-encompassing alliance that was built
with the “democratic” imperialist states in World War 2, you would have to show
that even without changing their nature it was possible to change the essence
of the actions of these imperialists for a certain period.” “There weren’t the
means at hand to change the basic character of even the actions of these
imperialists—that is, to change them into actions which would be principally
progressive, viewed in terms of objective content and objective effect.”[38]
Avakian poses the false issue of
trying to change the ‘essence’ of the actions of an imperialist state through a
united front, and gets the obvious answer in the negative. The real issue to be
judged is whether it was necessary and correct for the Soviet
Union to utilise the sharp contradictions that had emerged among
imperialist powers and form a united front with one bloc in order to surmount
the grave threat to its existence. Avakian wriggled away from answering this by
pulling in the issue of an “all-encompassing alliance”. Let’s leave aside the
question of whether this qualification of “all-encompassing” is correct. Even
if it were true and demanded criticism, was a limited tactical unity possible
and necessary? The answer is obviously in the affirmative. And that would also
imply a proper assessment of the particularities of that world situation, including
new factors such as the existence of a socialist state and the distinction
between fascism and bourgeois democracy.
What is notable here is that the
very logic of Avakian’s arguments severely hindered such an assessment. It made
any distinction between the enemies irrelevant. Thus the need to go into the
particularities of fascism, the specific set of contradictions it generated
(including the one with bourgeois democracy), and the opportunities and
challenges it posed was summarily rejected. In the name of correcting the
errors committed by the Comintern, Avakianism reduced Leninism to a set of
lifeless doctrines.
Following his standard procedure
Avakian hadn’t forgotten to hedge his position. After ruling out any role for a
united front in that situation, he wrote, “… in World War 2 the imperialists …
also, it’s true, adopted certain specific tactics as to how they wanted to go
about that. A socialist country and a strong international movement may be
able to affect some of that in a secondary way, tactically, and that may be
important in certain aspects, but to think that in any basic way or as a
principal aspect of things you can affect the way in which the relations among
the imperialists find expression is a very serious error and leads you in the
direction of becoming a tail upon the bourgeoisie…”; “It [meaning the
proletariat] can, where it holds state power, by certain tactical measures and
manoeuvres increase certain divisions, make use of and perhaps deepen certain
divisions that do exist among the imperialists…”[39] But doesn’t this admit the
usefulness of such tactics? Doesn’t it accept that a socialist state can and
should enter ‘dangerous territory’ and try to “…manoeuvre the imperialists to
fight this way and not that way …”? Doesn’t it contradict Avakian’s main
argument against such tactics?
Arguing against identifying some
among the imperialist forces as main enemies, Avakian stated that this would
inevitably lead to the position of “saying that the other imperialists are not really
enemies.”[40]
The absurdity of this position is all too apparent when we recollect that
identifying one as the main target comes up only in a context where we try to
differentiate between enemies. Hence, such differentiation does not
automatically render the others, who are not considered the main enemy,
as friends. They ‘really’ remain as enemies though the communist party should
apply different methods in handling the contradictions among these two
categories of enemies. As the experience of China showed us, it has to be
vigilant even against the reactionary forces it has allied with.
Avakian claims that his criticism
is focussed against seeking out the main enemy at the international level. He
even states that the CPC was correct in singling out Japan and allying with the
Koumintang. But, if his logic against singling out a main enemy is correct, if such
differentiation inevitably means that the others are not really enemies,
then there is no reason to restrict it to the world level. It should be equally
applicable within a specific country. Hence, in the final analysis, though
Avakian acknowledges the correctness of the CPC entering into an alliance with
Chang Kaishek, his logic actually rules out united front activity with a
section of reactionary forces. This is an acute example of infantilism born of
Avakianism’s doctrinaire approach.[41]
Finally, is it true that there is
no justification at all for identifying the main enemies at the international
level? No. In a situation where a socialist state exists this is absolutely
relevant and necessary within the domain of diplomacy. This brings us to
another serious error promoted by Avakianism. In its critique of the ‘United
Front against Fascism’ promoted by the CPSU and Comintern during the 2nd
world war and the ‘Three Worlds Theory’ (TWT) of the Chinese revisionists, it
fails to differentiate the strategic orientation of the international
proletariat from the diplomacy of a social state. It has, in the main,
correctly criticised the CPSU led by Stalin for imposing the interests of the Soviet Union above those of the ICM. The Soviet Union’s diplomatic manoeuvres and policies were
presented as the international strategy of the proletariat. But instead of
rectifying this, the RCP commits the opposite mistake. It eliminates any role
for diplomatic manoeuvres and policies of a socialist state and all that this
implies.
This is amply exposed in its
arguments against the TWT. Formally, the RCP has denied the Chinese
revisionist’s claim that this theory was a creation of Mao. But, in essence, it
has argued the opposite. Thus Avakian charged Mao of not only seeking an
international united front with the USA and its allies against the
Soviet bloc, but of considering this as the “…focus for the international
movement and the form through which it should carry out the struggle.”[42] In essence this attributes
the TWT to Mao Tsetung. The preposterous allegation that the TWT was put
forward by Mao Tsetung was refuted as “revisionist slander” by the 2nd
International Conference. Why did the RCP become a conduit for such slander
even while it was on the whole struggling to uphold the banner of Mao Tsetung?
Its immediate roots lie in Avakianism’s erroneous arguments against
differentiating among enemies and refusal to recognise and address the role of
a socialist state’s diplomatic moves.
In the specific issue being
examined here, this was manifested in its stubborn opposition to the separation
made by Maoists between Mao’s differentiation of the world into three and the TWT.
In the early 1970s, Mao noted the three-way differentiation of the world: the
First world composed of two superpowers (US and Soviet imperialists), a Second one
composed of other intermediary imperialist countries and the Third world of
oppressed countries.[43] This provided the
international proletariat with a broad picture of the existing balance of power
in the world. Recognition of this reality was never used by the Maoists in China to impose
a strategic orientation of uniting with one or the other reactionary power at
the international level. Rather they stuck to the view that “…the people of the
Third World are the main force combating
imperialism, colonialism and hegemonism, the motive force of revolution
propelling history forward.”[44]
The differentiation of the world
into three served as an orientation for China’s foreign policy in that
period. It helped it to utilise contradictions between the two super powers and
break the diplomatic blockade. This was correct and necessary. But several
mistakes were made in its implementation. The Declaration of the RIM has
described how the revisionists in China
“…controlled to a large degree its diplomacy and the relations between the
Chinese Communist Party and other Marxist-Leninist parties, turned their backs
on the revolutionary struggles of the proletariat and the oppressed peoples or
tried to subordinate these struggles to the state interests of China.”[45] These revisionists tried to
utilise Mao’s division of the world into three and impose the foreign policy of
China
as the strategic orientation of the international proletariat. This was finally
given a full-fledged form through the ‘Three Worlds Theory’ put out by them
after seizing power and restoring capitalism in China. This theory declared the
Soviet social imperialists as the main enemy. It called on the Maoists to unite
with the US
imperialist bloc and all reactionaries allied with it in the name of fighting
the main enemy.
Those parties which capitulated to
Chinese revisionism, and some who took a centrist stand, upheld this theory. In
the case of the latter, their failure to differentiate between the division of
the world into three and the revisionist’s distorted use of this to concoct
their theory, contributed to their mistaken stand. The attack of the Albanian
party led by Enver Hoxha against the TWT committed the same mistake from the
opposite end. It too failed to differentiate between the two. Avakianism
absorbed this dogmato-revisionism through its failure to distinguish between
the diplomatic policies and tactics of a socialist state and the international
strategy of the ICM. Its argument that it is wrong to separate out a main enemy
at the international level flows from this.
One or the other imperialist power
or reactionary force may be the main enemy for the revolutionary movement in a
specific country. But all are equally enemies for the international
proletariat. This is admitted by Avakianism, and that’s correct. But is that
true for a socialist state? No, it isn’t. So long as it exists in a world
dominated by imperialism, a socialist state must necessarily identify the
contradictions among imperialist powers, and make diplomatic moves to utilise
them in its favour. At certain junctures, one or the other imperialist power
may emerge as the main threat, the main enemy. In that situation its diplomatic
policy must try to isolate the main enemy (enemies). This may necessitate the
formation of an alliance or united front with other imperialist powers. In the
likelihood that socialist states will be a minority for a long time to come, contra
the infantilism of Avakian,[46] we can realistically expect
this to be the rule rather than the exception. The mistake is not in
identifying the main enemy or forming tactical alliances with other powers. The
mistake is in subordinating the strategic orientation of the international
proletariat - unifying the proletarian socialist revolution and new democratic
revolution into a world revolution that will destroy all imperialism and
reaction - to the foreign policy of a socialist state.
This state belongs to a contingent
of the international proletariat. But, as a state in a particular country, it
has its own interests which could be at variance with that of the international
proletariat at particular junctures.[47] This contradiction cannot be
ignored. The interests of a socialist state are part of those of the
international proletariat. But they
cannot be equated. The former cannot replace the latter. The opposite is
equally true. The specific interests and compulsions faced by a socialist state
cannot be denied in the name of upholding the interests of the ICM. It must be
given due weight and role, subordinate to the strategic orientation of the
proletariat. The struggle waged by a socialist state in the realm of diplomacy
is an important part of the world revolution. We must never forget that the
socialist state will be the main instrument through which the international
proletariat can intervene at the world level, until the world revolution
reaches a high level.
The Declaration of the RIM notes, “In
circumstances of imperialist encirclement of (a) socialist state(s) defending
these revolutionary conquests is a very
important task for the international proletariat. It will also be necessary for
socialist states to carry out a diplomatic struggle and at times to enter into
different types of agreements with one or another imperialist power. But the
defense of socialist states must always be subordinate to the overall progress
of the world revolution and must never been seen as the equivalent (and
certainly not the substitute) for the international struggle of the
proletariat. In certain situations the defense of a socialist country can be
principal, but this is so precisely because its defense is decisive for the
advance of the world revolution.”[48] The record of the ICM in
this matter is rather poor. (The latest example being Nepal.)
Avakian’s accusations against Mao of trying to force Maoist parties to toe
Chinese foreign policy interests are baseless. But even then the fact remains
that there were serious lacunae in the way this was handled.
Mao
didn’t repeat the errors of Stalin and the Comintern. But that was not enough.
In view of past experiences, it could readily be foreseen that the new turn in China’s foreign
policy would inevitably bring up the danger of rightism and tailism. Sufficient
attention was not paid to ideologically arm the ICM to face these dangers. This
is an important lesson we must keep in mind. Above all, Maoist parties must arm
themselves with the lesson given by Mao: it is possible for the imperialist
countries and the socialist countries to reach certain compromises but such
compromises do not require the people in the countries of the capitalist
world to follow suit and make compromises at home. The people in those
countries will continue to wage different struggles in accordance with their
different conditions.[49]
This gives the correct orientation.
[1]‘On Contradiction’, emphasis added, op. cit.
69“In
countries under the oppression of imperialism and feudalism the political party
of the proletariat should raise the national banner and must have a programme
of national unity by which to unite with all the forces that can be united,
excluding the running dogs of imperialism.”, ‘Some Experiences in Our Party’s
History’, MSW 5.
[3]‘The Role of the Chinese Communist Party in the National War’, MSW
2.
<http://marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-2/mswv2_10.htm>
The Avakianists argue, “…this formulation confounds two different questions:
the stage of the revolution in China
which needed to carry out new democratic revolution, and the ideology and
orientation of the communists which could not be ''patriotism''.” (RCP Letter)
They in fact confound truth by talking of ‘new democratic revolution’ in order
to conceal their undermining of the national task. Moreover, the ideological
question Mao poses of being patriotic on an internationalist ideological basis
is avoided. Mao’s position directly draws on Lenin’s argument that, “In a genuinely
national war the words “defence of the fatherland” are not a deception
and we are not opposed to it.” (‘A Caricature of Marxism and Imperialist
Economism’, emphasis in original) <http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenon/works/1916/carimarx/index.htm>
Obviously, ‘defence of the fatherland’ is a patriotic slogan. But the Avakianist’s
carefully avoid extending their criticism to Lenin (on this occasion).
[5] ‘Madison, Jefferson and Stalin…and
Communism as a Science’, Observations on Art, Culture, Science and Philosophy,
Bob Avakian, Insight Press, Chicago, September 2005, page 65, henceforth
‘Observations…’
[6]In an earlier period, yet to decisively swing over to ‘Leninism as
the key link’, Avakian had a better appreciation of these issues. Thus in an
article published in 1980, ‘On the Question of So-Called “National Nihilism’, he
is quoted as saying, “I do not believe that in a fundamental sense there is for
a communist such a thing as national pride. Mao Tsetung posed the question,
’Can a communist, who is an internationalist, at the same time be a patriot?’
Mao correctly and explicitly said that in the colonial countries that ’he not
only can be but must be.’ I think that is a question of practical political
stand. That is correct … In colonial countries it is correct for people to
stress the struggle against the feelings of national inferiority and to build
up a national pride of the people in the sense that they are not inferior as a
nation. But that always has to be done – and here it gets to the basic point - not
on the basis of nationalism but internationalism…”
<http://www.marxists.org/history/erol/ncm-5/rcp-national.htm>
Though his ‘‘Conquer...’’ contradicts this position, it still refers to this
article without any critical remark. There is even more of this eclectical
offering. At one point even the ‘Conquer’ article keeps aside its criticisms on
‘nationalist’ deviations and endorses the policy of ‘defence of the fatherland’
in an oppressed nation.
[7]‘Imperialist economism’ was a tendency criticised by Lenin. Its
proponents formally accepted the distinction between imperialism and the
colonies. But they then went on to eliminate its implications from their
politics by denying the right to self-determination including secession of the
oppressed nations, arguing that it was economically unfeasible under
imperialism. See ‘A Caricature of Marxism and Imperialist Economism’, op. cit.
The RCP dilates on internationalism (of a rather spurious variety) in order to
disregard political, cultural issues posed by national oppression. The
distinction between imperialism and oppressed nations is rendered formal by
branding the taking up of national tasks in the latter type of countries as
nationalist deviations. Thereby the politics of new democratic revolution is
gutted.
[8]The tendency is not limited to the Avakianist camp. For example,
those grouped in the ‘Kasama project’ also oppose situating of the armed
resistance in Iraq and Afghanistan
within the imperialism/oppressed nation contradiction. As we had pointed out in our contribution to
the International Seminar of 2006, such tendencies insist on judging these
struggles solely by the class or ideology in leadership, excluding the
objective role played by them in a concrete situation. A resistance led by a
reactionary class in an oppressed country draws on the powerful anti-imperialism
of the people and can play a positive role in the world context. This places it
objectively within the imperialism/oppressed nation contradiction (the present
principal contradiction), even though the class leading will eventually
surrender to one or the other imperialist power. A more detailed examination of
this issue can be seen in ‘Islamic Resistance, the Principal Contradiction and
the War on Terror’, henceforth ‘Islamic…’ <https://thenewwave.wordpress.com/current-issue/
>
[9]RCP Letter. Lenin’s quote is from ‘Proletarian Internationalism and
the Renegade Kautsky”. <http://marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1918/prrk/index.htm>
The honest Avakianist’s itch to doctor quotes is once more demonstrated in its
rendering of Lenin’s quotation. In footnote 26 of their letter they give more
of Lenin’s quote, as follows, ''The Socialist, the revolutionary proletarian, the
internationalist, argues differently. He says: “I must argue, not from the
point of view of ‘my’ country (for that is the argument of a wretched, stupid,
petty-bourgeois nationalist who does not realise that he is only a plaything in
the hands of the imperialist bourgeoisie), but from the point of view of my
share in the preparation, in the propaganda, and in the acceleration of the
world proletarian revolution. That is what internationalism means, and that is
the duty of the internationalist, of the revolutionary worker, of the genuine
Socialist.” The Avakianist’s have simply left out quite a lot (without even an
ellipse) between the first and second sentences of this quote. It actually reads
like this, “The socialist, the revolutionary proletarian, the internationalist,
argues differently. He says: “The character of the war (whether it is
reactionary or revolutionary) does not depend on who the attacker was, or in
whose country the ’enemy’ is stationed; it depends on what class is waging the
war, and on what politics this war is a continuation of. If the war is a
reactionary, imperialist war, that is, if it is being waged by two world groups
of the imperialist, rapacious, predatory, reactionary bourgeoisie, then every
bourgeoisie (even of the smallest country) becomes a participant in the
plunder, and my duty as a representative of the revolutionary proletariat is to
prepare for the world proletarian revolution as the only escape from the
horrors of a world slaughter. I must argue, not from the point of view of ’my’
country (for that is the argument of a wretched, stupid, petty—bourgeois
nationalist who does not realise that he is only a plaything in the hands of
the imperialist bourgeoisie), but from the point of view of my share in the
preparation, in the propaganda, and in the acceleration of the world
proletarian revolution.” When quoted in full it immediately becomes obvious
that the ‘point of view’ Lenin attacked was not about some different view on
world proletarian revolution or internationalism as implied by the
Avakianist’s. He was exposing bourgeois
chauvinism and differentiating proletarian internationalism from it.
[10]The Tasks of the
Proletariat in Our Revolution, Lenin, Collected
Works, Volume 24 (LCW 24). <http://marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1917/tasks/index.htm>
[11]‘Conquer...’, op. cit.
[12]In Memory of Norman Bethune, December, 1939, MSW 2 , page 337.
[13]‘Conquer...’, op. cit. Once again we are taxed with the unpleasant
job of ‘setting the record straight’. Citing Mao’s observation on the
‘intermediate zone’ in conversation with Anna Louise Strong, Avakian states
that he was lumping together the countries (except the Soviet Union)
immediately subjected to the aggression of U.S. imperialism with the other
imperialist countries. This is then made the base for indulging in some Hoxaism
and accusing “This involves a frankly classless concept of aggression and,
ironically, an error in the direction of blotting out the distinction between
imperialist and colonial countries.” What Mao really said was this, “The United
States and the Soviet Union are separated by a vast zone which includes many
capitalist, colonial and semi-colonial countries in Europe, Asia and Africa. Before the U.S.
reactionaries have subjugated these countries, an attack on the Soviet Union is out of the question.” (Talk with the
American Correspondent Anna Louise Strong’, MSW 4, page 99, emphasis added.)
[16]This is well explained in Lenin’s Two Tactics of Social-Democracy.
[17]‘Conquer...’, Part 2, emphasis added, op. cit.
[18]Avakian argues that Lenin was willing to ‘export revolution’ but
this was abandoned by those who came later. He cites the Red Army’s drive on Warsaw as proof. The
negative fallout of that move, the failure of the attempt made by the Comintern
to initiate and directly guide revolution in Germany, the hindrances caused by
Comintern advisors in China, the failure of the new states formed in East
Europe to develop as socialist societies, in large part due to mainly relying
on the Soviet army for their foundation and existence – Avakian has no time for
these real lessons of history. But they taught the communist movement that revolution
cannot be exported, though they can and must be aided in all possible ways.
Some instances of such international support were the participation of the
International Brigade in the Spanish Civil War (errors in policy
notwithstanding) and the direct role of revolutionary China in the
Korean War.
[19]Mao Tsetung, Critique of Soviet Economics, MSW 8. <http://marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-8/mswv8_64.htm>
[20]This meant working for the defeat of one’s own ruling class in the
war by utilising all means and thus preparing to convert the war into a
revolutionary civil war.
[21]‘‘Conquer...’’, op. cit.
[22]“We take pride in the resistance to these outrages put up from our
midst, from the Great Russians”; “It would be unseemly for us, representatives
of a dominant nation in the far east of Europe and a goodly part of Asia, to
forget the immense significance of the national question—especially in a country which has been rightly called
the “prison of the peoples”, and particularly at a time when, in the far east
of Europe and in Asia, capitalism is awakening to life and self-consciousness a
number of “new” nations…”; “We are full of a sense of national pride, and for
that very reason we particularly hate our slavish past (when the landed
nobility led the peasants into war to stifle the freedom of Hungary, Poland,
Persia and China), and our slavish present, when these selfsame landed
proprietors, aided by the capitalists, are goading us into a war in order to
throttle Poland and the Ukraine, crush the democratic movement in Persia and
China, and strengthen the gang of Romanovs, Bobrinskys and Purishkeviches, who
are a disgrace to our Great-Russian national dignity.”, ‘The National Pride of
the Great Russians’, LCW 21, pages 102-106. <http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1914/dec/12a.htm>
[23]It reminds us of the method used by the ‘Mother’, in Maxim Gorky’s novel
of the same name, to agitate against the war while standing in a queue of
people waiting to make their contributions to the Czar’s war effort.
[24]The treaty imposed on Germany
by Britain, USA and other
imperialist powers following its defeat in the 1st world war. Its terms were
extremely harsh.
[25]Lenin, ‘Left-wing Communsm-an Infantile Disorder’, Chapter 8, emphasis
added.
[26]“In the present situation, however, the German Communists should
obviously not deprive themselves of freedom of action by giving a positive and
categorical promise to repudiate the Treaty of Versailles in the event of
communism’s victory…The possibility of its successful repudiation will depend,
not only on the German, but also on the international successes of the Soviet
movement.”, ibid.
[27]‘Conquer...’, op. cit.
[28]Ibid.
[29]‘The Junius Pamphlet’, LCW 22, pages 305-319. <http://marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1916/jul/junius-pamphlet.htm>
Junius argued that “…the imperialist war
programme …” should have been opposed by the Social Democrats “…with the old, truly national programme of
the patriots and democrats of 1848… a truly national banner of liberation…”.
Responding to this Lenin pointed out how Junius “…proposes to “oppose” the imperialist
war with a national programme.” and thus fails to arrive at the correct
position of opposing it with revolutionary civil war. As usual the RCP
distorted the essence of the debate. It stated, “Junius wanted to oppose Germany’s part in the war on the basis of the
true interests and “best traditions” of Germany. It was precisely an
attempt to make internationalism more acceptable by trying to reconcile it with
nationalism.” (On the Question of So-Called “National Nihilism”, op. cit.)
[30]Ibid.
[31]Ibid.
[32]Bob Avakian, ‘Advancing the World Revolutionary Movement: Questions
of Strategic Orientation’, henceforth ‘Advancing…” <http://revcom.us/bob_avakian/advancingworldrevolution/advancingworldrevolution.htm>
This was a further elaboration of the views presented in his ‘Conquer...’.
[33]But it could in the long run, in the absence of a proletarian
revolution.
[34]Declaration of the RIM: The USSR and the Comintern. <http://bannedthought.net/International/RIM/Docs/RIM-Declaration-1984-A.pdf>
[35]‘Constitution for the New Socialist Republic
in North America – A Draft Proposal’, p ii,
emphasis added, henceforth ‘Constitution…’ <http://revcom.us/socialistconstitution/index.html>
[38]Ibid. It is known that the US and British governments had supplied
military equipment to the Soviet Union and communist armed forces in China and
some European countries during the 2nd world war. Going by Avakian’s logic
these should count as actions that were ’principally reactionary’ in their
‘objective content and effect’!
[39]Ibid, emphasis added.
[41]The RCP was guided by this approach in its opposition to the tactics
adopted in Nepal
of forming an alliance with reactionary parties against the Gyanendra monarchy.
The conversion of these tactics into a strategic orientation by the Prachanda-Bhattarai
revisionists, or the presence of this danger within the initial Chungwang
decisions that launched these tactics, do not in any way justify the RCP
precisely because doctrinarianism can never be an answer to revisionism. For
more exposure on the RCP criticisms on Nepal see <http://thenaxalbari.blogspot.com/2010/12/naxalbari-no-3-december-2010.html>
[42]‘Advancing...’, op. cit.
[43]Socialist China and Albania
were included in the Third World in view of
their underdeveloped state.
[44]‘Rise of Third World and Decline of Hegemonism’, Peking
Review, January 10, 1975.
[45]Mao Tsetung, the Cultural Revolution and the Marxist-Leninist
Movement. Declaration of the RIM, 1984, op. cit.
[46]Once this reality is denied one can dish up any number of infantile
formulas such as this one proposed by Avakian: “In fact, from a strategic
standpoint, and even in more immediate terms, the movement internationally
would be further advanced had such a correct line been formulated and fought
for—a position that said in essence, “look, we’re not going to have a united
front with one group of imperialists against another (even a united front
where we keep in mind that they are still imperialists and where we fight
against capitulation); instead, we’re going to seek another way of
dealing with the situation and even if, because of our own situation, we enter
into certain limited agreements and arrangements with some imperialists
and reactionary states, we are not going to make that a strategy for the
international proletariat.” (‘Advancing…’, emphasis added, op. cit.) We leave
it to the reader’s imagination to make out the fine line separating a tactical
united front from a ‘limited agreement’, as well as what the “other way” could
be.
[47]This once again underlines that this class is composed of different
contingents, existing in in different conditions, with differing national
distinctions. Its overall interest is manifested, worked out through these
particularities, not away from or above them as conceived of by Avakianism.
[49]‘Some points in appraisal of the present international situation’,
April 1946, MSW 4.
No comments:
Post a Comment