for debate - The New Palestinian Guerrillas, Adel Samara

The New Palestinian Guerrillas,

Adel Samara

 

Investment Performance, Fruitage, Exploitation,

Class and to where?

Adel Samara

Occupied Palestine

The neo-Fedayeen/ guerrillas phenomenon is a popular double innovation, and it will not be the last, which is:

 An extension of the struggle of a hundred years, it rises and declines, but it did not stop. A century was not enough to repel the normalizers with the enemy from their compromise, inferiority, and finally betrayal of the national cause. If they did not apologize and retreat it is necessary to be deterred. The counter-revolution requires from normalizers an inevitable subjugation based on their commitment to the Internalization of Defeat (IoD).

Events that happen in human societies impose themselves without consulting human beings. It is a challenge that says: Capture the event, participate in it, develop it, and share it. This is the case of the new Fedayeen/ guerrillas as an event. It came after and as a response against huge waves of Palestinian and Arab regimes’ normalization that reached the point of raising the defeat to the point of bragging about it.

It is the IoD that gave rise to the phenomenon of underestimating the entire struggle! Underestimation is never a coincidence or a passing statement. Rather, it is the necessary step needed to introduce defeat, so that the scene, even history, appears to be vain or a mirage. Hence, the event/phenomena/situation of the new Fedayeen bridged the gap in the direct physical and psychological senses.

The event was not just a mere accumulation of various forms of Palestinian struggle for hundred years, but rather it is redemption to the status to the level of legend, especially in terms of the unwavering attack by the new Fedayeen.

The 1987 uprising as a popular form of Palestinian struggle was an extended intifada from clandestine guerrilla groups to a mass/ popular movement challenging the enemy, and the 2000 intifada was intense in which weapons appeared, then the current uprising is a new form of struggle composed of:

·        One side, the solo/individual fighter to

·       The other the group of guerrillas/New Fedayeen.

The first began in 2015 and was launched by Muhannad al-Halabi as a solo guerrilla until Uday al-Tamimi 2022, a solo guerrilla as well and it will continue and the second is Areen Al-Aswad/Lions’ Den in cities of Jenin, Nablus al-Khalil/Hebron…etc 2022. It is an uprising that gave our people and nation two levels of guerrilla performance:

·        Absolutely a secret solo performance,

·        And group performance / public performance which is absolutely not a clandestine form.

I had written about solo individual guerrilla performance in my book: “The Engaged Intellectual and Individual/solo Operations Are Raffles to Overcome the Crisis 2017,” and I saw that Basil Al-Araj combines two components of real fighter: he combined radical intellectualism and weapons.

Our peoples’ continued struggle challenges with firm response the denial and expected forgetting our homeland.

This new phenomenon is the transfer of the popular presence to the active presence, as this phenomenon was not satisfied with “I think, therefore I exist” (Descartes), but rather confirmed that existence may be impermeable, while the most important thing is that I exist and have an active presence, i.e. the transition of “existent in itself to being for itself” (Marx).

 Accordingly, this phenomenon is a clash to the greatest degree with the various parties, i.e., enemies involved in the IoD and the variations forms of normalization with enemies who went to understate and distort the situation and provide explanations that are full or motivated by frustration.

Therefore, direct action with this level of confrontation and rehabilitation is reminiscent of Baader-Meinhof, the Red Brigades, and the proletarian left in France in 1968.

Uninterrupted Extension and Accumulation

It is the phenomenon of the movement of resistance and its aggravation, taking forms of performance according to the circumstances, and because this article is not a history of the Palestinian struggle for a century, I have shortened it to say since 1967 by mentioning, and not analyzing, the forms of struggle within the occupied territory 1967:

Underground/secretly armed resistance began immediately in the West Bank and Gaza Strip after their occupation by the Zionist Ashkenazi Entity (ZAE) 1967. In the Gaza Strip, they had the most impact due to the availability of the Palestine Liberation Army with its fighters and weapons, and the role of Nasserite Egypt in arming the Strip, while in the West Bank it depended on collecting remnants of weapons left by the Jordanian army during its withdrawal.

The West Bank was supplemented by armed groups/patrols that crossed Jordan River, which was better armed and trained than non-trained volunteers from the West Bank population.

 The exit of the P.L.O. from Lebanon led to the actual dismantling of the PLO by expelling the fighters and scattering them between Tunisia and southern Yemen, to prevail in a state of frustration that rejoiced by the enemy that everything was over, as Meron Benvenisti, the deputy mayor of occupied Palestinian city of Jerusalem, wrote at the time that the conflict with the Palestinians “has reached the last quarter of an hour.” But after a short time, the most prominent event surprised them and us, the 1987 Intifada uprising, which moved the struggle from the struggle of the elite to the struggle of the masses.

To the semi-armed intifada of 2000, for which the internalizers of defeat rejected its weaponization, underestimated it by calling it “militarism.”

One of the worst actions was a rejection of martyrdom operations by a group of intellectuals/academics published a statement in Al-Ayyam newspaper and its’ costs paid by the European Union! (See: Intellectuals in the Service of the Other: Statement of 55 Models / Appendix to the Book” Adel Samara 2003).

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The new Guerrillas in Terms of Performance

This phenomenon was based on two types of patriotic combat performance:

The first performance: it is the individual operations of the individual guerrillas mainly without any connection to this or that organization but might have a previous connection, or as an extension of the atmosphere of a patriotic family. But the guerrilla here was a moon that went out of its orbit, perhaps because the orbit could no longer accommodate it, or it lost its radiation/attraction. Here, it can be said that Muhannad al-Halabi 2015 was the one who inaugurated this phenomenon, which we can call the new guerrilla uprising, but not the first. It must be noted that calling the 1987 uprising the first intifada is not accurate, as it is a series of events, but it is more comprehensive and higher than its predecessors, perhaps with the exception of the 1936 revolution against British colonialism and Zionist settlers.

While Basil al-Araj, is one of the new individual guerrillas he is unique because he brought together Lenin’s revolutionary intellectual and Mao fighter, where the revolution stems from the barrel of a gun. He was the engaged intellectual, the term I formulated with honor. On the other level, Uday al-Tamimi’, unique courage who continued to shoot even after his martyrdom.

This performance is the model of the urban guerrilla fighter, from the camp, the village, who inflicts more losses on the enemy than he loses: a model, the son of the place/camp, the yard, the alleys, cautious, secretive, silent, careful observation, skilled in reconnaissance of the place of engagement, he is a real entrant and most importantly it is inherited line from one individual to another that has not stopped and will not stop, a series of rare individuals completely.

About these individual fighters Fedayeen and the hunger strikers for months, my 2017 book was “The Engaged Intellectual and Individual Operations Are Leverages to Overcome the Crisis.” Here is the expectation, albeit relatively, being fulfilled by the new Fedayeen.

I meant from the title and the book to read or come up with an opinion and conclusion that individual operations are a lever to restoring the collective struggle.

The Second Performance

This relative blockage in the front of the collective struggle is the factor behind the emergence of the phenomenon of the second performance, which are groups of fighters:

They work openly in a state of defiance of the occupation and the Palestinian Authority, where uprooting the fear of the occupation’s soldiers has resulted, i.e., “Boldness first, daring second, and daring forever / Robespierre.”

Groups’ members know each other and communicate openly with the knowledge of the people, the occupation, and the apparatus of the PA, walking around in arms and military clothing in public

Is this falling in acceptance of the tricky policy of the former Zionist Prime Minister Menachem Begin 1977 which encourages people to declare their support of P.L.O publicly which reveals their loyalty and facilitates its undermining? Of course, this deception was supplemented by the Oslo Accords, which marketed as peace agreements, so public offices were opened for the various PLO factions, which created confusion and contradiction in the sense:

·        The occupation was not uprooted from the occupied areas.

·        And that the not secret struggle is not in liberated areas in order to establish guerrilla bases.

Uncovered and massive struggle is only a requirement for the moment of the final and comprehensive Palestinian and Arab battle of liberation.

The second performance operations are:

• Performed by more than one person.

• They act openly as if they are in areas liberated by a guerrilla war.

• public appearance in the city of Nablus as if the city is a liberated land!

While in the city of Jenin, it was more accurate, perhaps as if it was the third performance. Perhaps this is influenced by the Islamic Jihad movement. But even in Jenin there is a degree of openness, and therefore the enemy attacks from time to time to assassinate this or that, and he will continue this tactic

This phenomenon, the open struggle affected the public as its support increased. The reason for that fascination with their boldness may be more than the fascination with the degree of harm inflicted on the enemy. That is, the form of their performance, which is the readiness for martyrdom, raised the morale of the street.

Perhaps it is not easy to separate the two models/performances, as they are in the direction of raising the ceiling of resistance, no doubt, but the method of work in the first performance, the individual fighters, gives and even preserves the opportunity for continuity and permanence, and fewer losses and inflicting higher losses on the occupation.

We can point out here that the two performances were taken from and repeating the performance of the martyr Wadih Haddad a former founder and leader of PFLP in the planes hijacking i.e:

• First performance take covert, careful planning and nerve strength,

• And the second performance brought the issue back to the world’s attention despite attempts to obliterate it, as interest in it reached four parts of the earth.

PA’s Position and other Parties

The Palestinian Authority (PA) suffers from a unique state of confusion as the ZAE pressures it to coordinate more, effectively, and more harmful against resistance. Some of its organs support and participate in the struggle, but as an authority, it pushes towards stopping the phenomenon by containing and assimilating/employing young people in the authority’s apparatus and promising to protect them from the enemy’s revenge or arrest, especially the case of Musab Shtayyeh. The phenomenon of New Fedayeen obliged all security forces of the ZAE, the PA and even the CIA to terminate it. Dr M.Amasri a national figure in Nablus city said in this video that CIA members participated in the PA’s attempts to contain these Fedayeen.

In the first/individual performance, the effectiveness of security coordination between the PA and ZAE is weak in tracking isolated, completely confidential cases.

In the second case, the popular containment of the Lions’ Den led to the authority’s having to take a middle position, at least in public, as we mentioned, trying to include them in the ranks of the agencies, ensuring the safety…etc, and communicating with them or their families. There is no doubt that this was coordinated with the ZAE and CIA as I noted above. But all offers were rejected.

Here it is worth asking: Has the PA reached the adoption of a division of labor? Meaning let everyone struggle as he sees it, and let the authority continue on the negotiating track! We do not know.

But the outcomes of the Algiers Conference for Palestinian Reconciliation in October 2022 were even less than this demand, as the so called “Arab initiative” 2002 was adopted, that is, normalization with the ZAE fruitless on the one hand, and contradicts the new Fedayeen/guerrilla action on the other.

The Arab Summit Conference in Algeria in November 2022 also comes with the intention of presenting an injection of frustration against New Fedayeen phenomenon regardless of whether this injection has reached the limit of its impact.

Other parties have also contributed in containing and weaken this phenomenon, such as:

• The focus of some of the internalizars of defeat that the solution for Arab Zionist conflict is to follow the South African model, meaning that the issue is in racism, apartheid and Zionist ideology, which argues that if the Zionists abandon Zionism, the conflict ends! This is a proposal adopted by the Trotskyites in ZAE in 1994, and many Palestinian intellectuals and self-defeated leftist cadres were involved in it. We are not here in the process of detailing the huge difference between the two cases, but rather that the conflict here is that the land belongs to one party, which is us, and therefore the project is liberation. The position of these intellectuals reminds me of the sitting of Russian intellectuals at the beginning of the Bolshevik October Revolution, including Maxim Gorky, who was drinking vodka in cafes and joking about the workers and peasants fighting the Tsar’s armies! (For comparison with South Africa, see:

(The Israeli Apartheid in the Context of Oslo Accords: Why it is Oslostan, not Bantustan. In Adel Samara: Debatable Issues: Polemic Ideas, 2000, p.p. 68-83).

• Some claimed that this phenomenon, especially the second performance, i.e. The battalions and the Lions’ Den, is the result of a stifling economic crisis that pushed young people to this form of struggle as if it were a state of despair and need. But these are false allegations. The economic situation in the West Bank is not so deteriorating in the current year. Rather, the ZAE absorbs the local labor force with wages that reach 3-4 times that in the West Bank, which led to the lack of sufficient labor force for the local economy. These young people are of working age and can work in the ZAE for attractive wages, even if they are not professionals, or mental laborers.

The question: Is the ZAE doing it because of its need for the local labor force, to distract the youth from the struggle, or to undermine the production sites in the occupied West Bank and Gaza, leading to production baldness, or for all these reasons?

 This is not to mention what is said or rumored that the funding of the Battalion groups and the Lions’ Den is abundant.

Others argue that New Fedayeen’s goal is the deconstruction of the ZAE. This has two contradictory interpretations:

·        The first: stripping the ZAE of the land and stripping it of its military power, including nuclear, and the return of the Palestinian people to their land and homes, and Palestine must be part of the Arab unity state. This is only done after liberation.

·        The second: It is intended that the ZAE voluntarily abandons the Zionist ideology, and thus everything that happened remains as it is, i.e., in its nuclear hand, the army, the land, the homes…etc. What are meant by this form of the solution are complete surrender and the liquidation of the Palestinian cause and its absolute disengagement from the depth of Arabism.

Within this proposition lies Ilan Pappe’s thesis that the Palestinian situation is a state of ethnic cleansing! This is a proposition whose foundations are crumbling for more than one reason, including:

First: In cases of ethnic cleansing, the dominant and defeated parties have a right to the homeland, and this is not the case in Palestine.

The second: Ethnic cleansing takes a specific geographical situation, not a comprehensive one, and this is not the case for Palestine, because the enemy has created a state of the expulsion of the Palestinian people, but rather aims beyond even from the Euphrates to the Nile and even the Upper Nile.

·        .

• Some have repeated what others have previously said, such as Azmi Bishara and his affiliates, “The National Commission for Preserving Constants /2009-2010” under the pretext of renewing the PLO, or the current call on behalf of 14 million Palestinians to rebuild the PLO, which they have nothing to be rebuilt, It is impossible to be achieved, reconstructed because those initiate reconstructions are never different characters of those who led P.L.O to its current debacle or the so-called “new Palestinian revolutionary path Almasar Althawri Al Filistiny Albadil” raised in the incubators of imperialism, which supports the war of Terrorist Orientalism against Syria, stands as Turkey’s enemy stands and stands against Arab axis of resistance. This contradictory but sneaking position influenced and in harmony with the Zionists Bin Gurion and Jabutinsky’s argument that the fate of “Israel” conditioned by the destruction of Syria.

Enemy Response

New Fedayeen is the popular or human contrive/innovation that confirms the superiority of man over machine despite and in consideration of its scientific and dangerousness. Despite the technological capabilities of the ZAE, which is the essence of the capabilities of the western imperialist center, and despite the “innovations” of the intelligence services and spies, the ZAE did not catch this case in advance and was not able to eradicate it, especially the individual performance, if we do not include here the creativity of liberating the five prisoners by penetrating the Gilboa prison fortress inside the ZAE.

In the two models/performances of the New Fedayeen, the occupation was surprised by this bold and unexpected model.

In the first model, the individual model: spies/agent has been paralyzed, the phenomenon has not been paralyzed since 2015 and here it is in 2022. In terms of diversity, it takes the form of a national front / a chain that is actually extended on an individual basis and not by communication or links between one another. It covers a comprehensive but mobile geography with the absence of factional adoption. Individual performance/model is not considered a renewal of the factions a case which increases criticism against the factions to the point of underestimating them by a malicious decision.

In the second model, agents used all weapons that have been or have been used because the place of the Fedayeen guerrilla is self-proclaimed. It is a case of frontal war, like the war of armies, and not the war of the position, as Gramsci suggested.

Is ablation of the New Fedayeen done? Perhaps not, but the enemy excels with prolonged closures and by launching intensive raids and massive forces on the cities, Jenin, Nablus, Hebron, raids from day to day to exhaust the community and guerrilla groups and assassinate what they can, especially because excessive publicity helps it.

This prompts the question: Is it possible to change the method and stop publicity?

Perhaps the enemy knows that there is a factional adoption of this performance, especially the return of some of these factions to adopting certain operations in a classical way. As for the adoption of some factions for individual operations, no one confirms or denies their role in them. Rather, the important thing is that adoption contributes to a return to the previous form that was unable to transform into a national front and this makes the enemy’s penetration of these groups easier! Although this form of performance, the new guerrilla/New Fedayeen, is calculated as a relative renewal of the Palestinian resistance factions, reduces the underestimation of the resistance factions.

The Class Origin of the Phenomenon

An enthusiastic adventure, as much as the excitement of these young men, for someone to analyze the class origin of these heroes at least because it is a very new phenomenon.

This is what he asked me to do, the beautiful comrade Said Muhammad.  Therefore, what I will write are only estimates that cannot be included in the scientific or academic realm, but in the realm of revolutionary longing.

In responding to colonialism, most social classes join forces to respond, repel and liberate, and when colonialism is an uprooting white settler colonial capitalist one like the ZAE, the participation in resistance is more comprehensive.

As a very new phenomenon early class analysis of it becomes difficult. The presence of a reliable revolutionary party role to initiate, mobilize and fight may help in this.

Why is the New Fedayeen Fight Attractive?

Because accepted fighting is what the masses point to, so the New Fedayeen are simple and humble teachers as long as they pick up where people’s eyes, minds, and emotions point.

This means that the basis or starting point is to start patriotically, nationally, not ideologically.

 People flocked to the armed struggle immediately, despite the defeat of 1967, because they knew that this struggle was the way.

In the first current performance of the guerrillas, i.e., the individual operations, we did not notice any slogans, drawings, or “logo” …etc. Rather, an individual championship is making its way purely nationally and will continue and will not end, but its class origin is neither petty-bourgeois/middle-class nor from the capitalist class either, the comprador or the purely commercial, or the subcontractor, nor the recipient segment of the invisible income, and of course they are not the NGOs. Also, these people are not from the supporters of the ruling bureaucratic leadership class, and they are not from the factions except rarely, for example, the guerrillas from the Jamal family in Jerusalem from the PFLP, and often they, and others, have graduated from the schools of this or that faction.

The battalions/the second model/performance/Lion’s Din are not very different from individual cases; they are from the popular classes.

There is more than one question about the Lion’s Den, the most important of which is its source or organizational link and the source of its funding.

At the class level, one can place the following estimates.

In terms of the average age, the phenomenon is made up of young people, most of who are under the age of 25, and this means that their theoretical intellectual experience is beginner/initial, meaning that their starting point is basically a national one.

Some infer that their religious orientation is from placing the image of Al-Aqsa. Probably. But the status of Al-Aqsa is the same for all Palestinians, Christians, and Muslims, and for leftists and even Marxists. It basically symbolizes the homeland, so some of them use the red keffiyeh, which indicates the left’s organizational origin, for example, the martyr Tamer Al-Kilani.

What supports my guess is that the weapon is also placed with the picture, and this means that the issue is a national jihadist issue, even for the religious, and not religious in the sense of a Politicized Religion (PR.)

As for the influence of the forces of PR, the jihadist wing on them, then I think yes.

As for factions influence on the phenomenon, it is important to note that the factions that have financial capabilities are in addition to the Fatah movement as an authority, with a religious, political, and jihadist orientation, and this is not a coincidence because Iranian support requires that. The late Ahmad Jibril, the founder of PFLP the General Command said on Al-Mayadeen Channel that Iran offered him to name his faction the Islamic Front in order to get what he wanted from the support!

And the story of Iranian support is what was leek by the interrogation of the detainee, Musab Shtayyeh, and people circulated it; where he confirmed the existence of great financial support for the Lions’ Den. When a person enlists in a particular faction, he must be influenced by the faction’s vision, determinants, and ideology, which sometimes transcend nationalism toward an ideology and, in the given case, a religious one. Just for comparison while members of Lions’ Den carry new guns Udi Altamimi as an individual hero uses a simple pistol.

These young men are undoubtedly from the popular classes. They are concentrated in the city, as it became clear from the clashes and the assassination of the five martyrs in November 2022 at once in the old city of Nablus. They are in the Yasmina neighborhood in Nablus, the al-Ratrut neighborhood, which is a popular neighborhood, and in Jenin, mostly from the refugee camp, Udai Altamimi from the Shuafat camp, others from al-Aroub camp…etc. Perhaps the choice of the old town in Nablus is because it is more protected in terms of construction for them as an old town, meaning that the place is not a condition to have a class connotation by inevitability and definiteness, but rather the connotation of the favorable location.

And since they are from the popular classes, in the camp, in the village, and in the city, this gives them mass protection, and this is neither provided nor concerned by most of the other classes, i.e., the bourgeoisie and the middle class.

On the other hand, the traditional analyses of the resistance in the previous decades described the camps as exclusively its incubator and generator. However, the current situation shows that these Fedayeen are embraced by all sectors of society in the village, camp, and city, and this is clearer among the popular classes. We may infer this further by reading the crowds that demonstrate, whether in support of the Fedayeen or their funerals. You may find the bourgeois in the place of mourning a martyr, and not in a funeral or a demonstration.

But here comes the role of age determination. At such an age, they are less linked or rooted in class, meaning that they are only students or young workers, and this means that they are not from the bourgeoisie and are not specifically from the comprador bourgeoisie, nor the commercial class, nor the subcontracting class…etc.

With regard to individual cases, Muhannad al-Halabi is from an ordinary family and his father, a plumber, is an individual case, or almost the beginning of the individual phenomenon. The citizens immediately reconstructed his parents’ demolished home. Uday Al-Tamimi from Shuafat camp, Thaer Washaha is from the town of Bir Zeit, and Youssef Sihweil is from the village of Ebwain, both of whom are from very ordinary families in the class sense, and Al-Jabari is from the city of Hebron.

Perhaps we can risk saying that the groups of Lions’ Den and the battalions are from the city and the individual guerrillas are from the camps and villages.

And if the Lion’s Den is a grouping of organizations, this means that some of them are renewing themselves and that they are from the working class and the peasant youth, but their leaders are not necessarily from the popular classes but from the middle.

Lessons Exploitation and Fruition

It is true that the performance in this phenomenon is double, individual, or of a limited number, but the fruition is national, popular, and social. So far, what is happening is a popular investment/fruition in terms of joy and embracing, but it is marred by factional exploitation to an annoying extent, and this actually embarrasses the factions and puts them in front of societal criticism.

The factions’ leaders promote the phenomenon, especially on the satellite media, in an attempt to gain popularity, and therefore do not direct any criticism or advice to stop reckless publicity or to direct young people to benefit from the experiences of the resistance over decades. They did not challenge the regime’s official normalization or compare it to popular redemption and does not incite/agitate the Arab street/masses to take it back from the forces of PR and the regimes organic intellectuals and orient them to support the new guerrilla phenomenon, because these leaders are compromising the official Palestinian and Arab regimes.

Factions’ leaders participated and cheered for the factional meeting of Algeria (October 2022), even though it was within the scope of the Arab normalization initiative collectively, which contradicts this Fedayeen phenomenon.

Some leaders exaggerate the phenomenon to the extent that they describe it as a comprehensive revolution, although this must be linked over time to the unity of all forces Palestinian and Arab when launching the final battle, in the war of liberation.

What we can venture to say here so far is to describe the phenomenon as local not national, positional, and mobile.

What the faction leaders are doing so far is exploitation, not an investment/fruition, especially for the factions that receive funding. This deprives the factions that do not receive funding from a tangible role. Rather, some of their fighters are leaking to the factions with capabilities. Therefore, some see that the performance or the second model Lions’ Den and Battalion are religious before it is national, and this serves an ideology that sees conflict and solution as religious!

Despite all this, the most important investment/fruition is in keeping the issue alive and at the forefront and imposing itself on a global level, which is very important in engaging and confronting the enemy with its enormous control over the global media.

There is another clash at the level of mutual attrition, where the enemy deepens and even penetrates our blood, and in return suffers from the exhaustion of moving many sectors of its forces over the entire West Bank, confusing and restraining its settlers and pushing some of them to leave. They are the ones who were brought under the influence of a lie that occupied Palestine as the safest place for the Jews. In fact, the phrase the safest place for Jews includes the admission that Jews are not universally welcomed! This is in addition to human losses in the ranks of the enemy, although they are much less than the sacrifices of our people.

On the other hand, the media is exploiting this phenomenon by exaggerating it to gain a reputation at its expense. It is mean and irresponsible exploitation or in the service of certain masters, especially its financiers.

In the exploitation rush, it is lost with the intent of pan-Arab support of the phenomenon, even though the Arab people are highly attached to it despite of regimes’ normalization.

The investment in what is positive means that it is necessary to differentiate between the mistakes of leaders in the resistance movement, the factions, and criticizing these mistakes, concessions, and negligence, and underestimating the resistance, because underestimating the resistance is a prelude to underestimating all forms of struggle, specifically this phenomenon of the new guerrillas, taking into consideration its’ shortened time and quickly reached four parts of the planet where it forced the enemy/ZAE  and Arab normalizing regimes’ media to acknowledge her presence even before the resistance notification.

Counter-revolutionary forces and theorists are trying to limit this phenomenon to a specific moment. Or the claim that it is a unique case completely apart and strange from the course of the Palestinian and Arab struggle in general and that it is a case or phenomenon that has no explanation in the context of the Arab-Zionist/imperialist conflict!

Relying on what I mentioned above from readings of the phenomenon, including the fact that the phenomenon has so far been mobile, local, positional, the guerrilla struggle must continue as it is, i.e., mobile, positional…etc throughout time until the comprehensive and final Palestinian/Arab last war of liberation.

There is no revolution or resistance that begins and continues at an intense pace that is not afflicted by ups and downs. This phenomenon/scene is not a surreal case/without any connection to old or new history, but rather an extension of an extended struggle sometimes and sometimes intense.

We can be certain that the first performance of individual operations will not stop with what is the direct and close expression of the latent strength of any society facing colonialism, especially uprooting settlers. Here we must recall the mistake and sin of Palestinian intellectuals who were involved in devouring the thesis of some Zionists that the Palestinian national movement was born due to the Zionist settlement invasion! But resistance is a latent force in any society, which appears and intensifies whenever the challenge appears and intensifies, meaning that resistance is a local generation and aggression is nothing but a challenge that must be confronted, and when aggression is not, the potential force takes other paths for a better life for nations.

The enemy can eradicate the public performance/the Lions’ Den at some time and to a certain time, but this group/detachment performance can be re-emerged and can benefit from the expensive public experience to take a secret form, whether through factions or through the formation of a new faction, and the important thing remains that this performance is not against the factions it also promotes the public against counter-revolution.

And because the possibility of reviving the PLO is not possible after all it has been involved in, the course of the struggle may take two complementary directions:

• Secret work inside the occupied territory, whether by individual or group performance,

• And crystallizing a leadership for it directly in the axis of resistance, let it be called the PLO or other than that name is not a problem.

It remains pointed out that this phenomenon has managed to impose a lot, including that the settlers no longer control the streets except by intensely protecting the occupation soldiers. It challenges the Arab camp of IoD which attempts and looks for holes/chances to negotiate through with the enemy. The antagonistic contradiction confirms that the struggle is the way. Yes, blessed is he who does not change and does not get tired. This road alone opens the way for the restoration of the Arab masses’ direct action and support, especially at a moment in time in which the counter-revolution was able to:

• Getting the official Arab regimes out of the conflict

• Getting many Arab parties out of the conflict.

The struggle for the steadfastness of the people’s front became unbreakable. Therefore, we saw the rejoicing of the Arab popular classes for this phenomenon, despite the rush of the regimes.