– ANALYSIS
On August 20, 2014, the Union Cabinet approved the extension of
mobile telephonic services to 2,199 locations affected by Left Wing
Extremism (LWE) in the States of Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisgarh,
Jharkhand, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Odisha, Telangana, Uttar Pradesh
and West Bengal. The project would be executed by Bharat Sanchar Nigam
Limited (BSNL). BSNL has already installed towers at 363 of these
locations.
The Universal Service Obligation Fund (USOF) would fund the capital
expenditure and operative expenditure, net of revenue, for five years.
The project implementation cost through the open tendering process is
approximately INR 35.68 billion. In 2013, the Cabinet had approved just
over INR 30 billion for the project. The project was delayed by more
than a year, apparently, because of differences over project cost. The
USOF which is administered by Department of Telecom (DoT) was created
under the National Telecom Policy of 1999 to help provide telecom
services at affordable prices to people in rural areas where no phone
facilities are available.
While USOF will provide both capital expenditure and operational
expenditure components of the proposed mobile rollout for five years,
the ownership of the assets to be created is proposed to be vested with
BSNL to ensure long-term continuity of services. The network rollout
will be monitored by the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (UMHA), as it is
aimed at beefing up communications and surveillance operations by
national security agencies in these regions. It is also learnt that UMHA
and the Prime Minister’s Office want the project to get underway
immediately as “it is of national importance with security
considerations,” and is running a year behind schedule, a top BSNL
official told the media. BSNL has already identified a sizeable number
of tower sites in consultation with the UMHA. Initially, towers will be
erected at places close to security camps and Police stations.
The project to install the towers in the Communist Party of
India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist)-affected areas was conceived in 2010 when P.
Chidambaram was the Union Home Minister, but there was little progress
in the matter since then. After the Maoist attack on the State
leadership of the Congress party in Chhattisgarh on May 25, 2013, the
Union Cabinet approved the project to install 2,199 mobile towers at a
cost of INR 30.46 billion, and June 2014 was set as the deadline for
completion of the task. Thus far, however, only 363 towers have been
installed. Concerned about the delay, UMHA has been pressuring the
Telecom Department to expedite installation of towers.
One reminder was sent a week before the March 11, 2014, Maoist attack
in Sukma District in Chhattisgarh, in which 15 Security Force (SF)
personnel and one civilian were killed. The then Union Home Minister,
Sushil Kumar Shinde, observed, in a letter dated March 4, 2014, “The
poor communication network in the Naxal-affected areas is a matter of
serious concern.” Stressing the need to have a better communications
network in place before the Lok Sabha elections, Shinde emphasised that
installation of mobile towers should be expedited, especially in the
highly Maoist-affected States such as Jharkhand, Bihar and Odisha, and
called for an ‘all-out effort’ to complete the whole process before the
Lok Sabha elections.
Shinde’s letter noted, further, “The work was awarded to Bharat
Sanchar Nigam Limited (BSNL) and installation and roll out of mobile
towers was targeted to be completed in 12 months.” The difference over
project cost, about INR 7.89 billion, between actual requirement and the
revised project budget approved by the Cabinet Committee of Economic
Affairs, in June 2013, was due to an ‘arithmetic error’, it was claimed.
Official sources argued, “There is an arithmetical mistake in annual
maintenance contract estimates, omission of certain items that are
required for roll out of projects, revision of VSAT bandwidth charges
and other. The DoT is studying it.”
Further, there were technical specification issues, such as whether
to go for a solar powered 2G network, and whether to go for 20 watts
‘base transceiver station’ (BTS)/cell phone tower or five watts, that
delayed the implementation of the project. These issues now appear to
have been settled, but the implementation of the project may still be
headed for a bumpy ride. First, the tender for the work was initially
floated by BSNL in August 2013, but received lukewarm responses, with
major global players opting out, and just three Indian players
participating. That is unusual in the prevailing economic situation,
when companies are struggling to maintain growth and profit margins, and
the contract was for approximately of INR 30 billion.
In March 2014, the Telecom Commission asked DoT and BSNL to go for
retendering, citing the project’s higher costs and poor response. After
two months of the re-tendering exercise, however, the two companies –
Vihaan Networks Ltd and HFCL – who had earlier qualified in the
technical bidding, were again in the fray, as no other company, Indian
or foreign, decided to participate. This was despite the extension of
the application deadline by a week in May. A BSNL official noted,
“During recent pre-bid meetings, global telecom gear suppliers were
reluctant to participate in the bidding as they felt that managing and
maintaining mobile networks in Naxal-hit regions is risky.”
A top executive of a leading foreign gear maker conceded that the
“additional responsibility of maintaining expensive solar-powered mobile
networks in Naxalite hotbeds is fraught with significant business
risks”. In such a situation, quality is likely to be first casualty. The
second issue is the provision of continuous power supply to the towers.
Solar power has its limitations, and even where power supply is not
very erratic, BSNL backup batteries start providing insufficient back
up, in some cases, within just one year, due to poor maintenance. Solar
panels need regular cleaning of the surface, as dust decreases the
efficiency of the panels.
Further, 24×7 availability (or at least availability at short notice)
of trained manpower is needed for maintenance of batteries, to
protected against full discharge. Even three or four full discharges
severely affect the efficiency of batteries. Further, the restoration
time in case of some fault in solar-power towers is unknown, but is
likely to be substantial, as local knowhow is limited. Arranging any
outside service in LWE-affected areas will create its own and
significant problems. Diesel supplies to run generators are even more
erratic, with BSNL managing an inefficient network of its own, whereas
private operators generally outsource the service to locals. Media
reports indicate that shortages in diesel supplies to mobile towers have
long been an issue in existing towers in Maoist-affected areas, with
nodal supply points located at long distances from the towers.
In a note sent to the Department in 2013, the Union Ministry of Home
Affairs observed, “it has come to the notice of MHA that some existing
BSNL towers in the LWE-affected areas remain shut for long periods of
time ostensibly due to non-availability of diesel to run the generators
etc. Hence, sufficient monitoring mechanisms may be put in place to
deliver better services.” It remains to be seen how these issues will be
addressed for the much wider network of towers envisaged in the current
project. The third issue is the identification of relatively secure
locations for the mobile towers. Though towers are initially to be set
up close to security camps and Police Stations, given the very poor
density of such establishments in Maoist affected areas, it will be
difficult to find appropriate locations for such a large number of
towers.
Further, the location of security camps and establishments are based
on strategic considerations, which may not coincide with the technical
requirements of the location of the towers. There is, moreover, the
BSNL’s track record of providing poor service even in areas where there
is no threat from Maoists. The organisation’s efficiency in Naxalite
afflicted regions can only be expected to be poorer. Crucially,
moreover, the Maoists recognize the threat that an efficient – or even
minimally working – cellular network constitutes to their own security
and survival, and have systematically attacked isolated mobile towers
wherever possible. According the UMHA, at least 245 such attacks are on
record just between 2008 and 2013. The penetration of a public
communications networks into their areas of operation has been
acknowledged by the Maoists to be one of the crucial elements leading to
a decline in their operational effectiveness and recruitment potential.
In their Social Investigation of North Telengana, in what was then the
worst affected region of Andhra Pradesh, the Communist Party of India –
Maoist, observed, as far back as in the early 2000s,
Earlier there was the post and telegraph department in the rural
area. Branch post offices were set up in the big villages. In addition
to these tele communications also came up rapidly… In the big villages
with a population of 5 to 7 thousand, there are 70 to 100 telephones.
But the facility is not spread over all the villages… Since phone can be
obtained with 600 rupees there are 300 applications from one village…
Cell phone facility spread to 60 kms up to Janagama, 40 kms towards
Mulugu, and near Bhupalapalli.This network exists in almost the whole
area of our operation. The cells are mainly established by the medical,
fertiliser, big grocery shops and some rich peasants.
Small contractors, political leaders and police informers also
bought them… The middle class is opposing the blasting of the exchanges.
The increased communication network facilitated the enemy to receive
our information soon… Now if a squad member goes to the village for food
and it is exposed, the police from the near by station can encircle us
within one hour. We are unable to identify who leaded the information
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